In het blog van 09-01-2017 kondigde ik aan: In mei zal Spinoza's
'Ethics': A Critical Guide verschijnen.
En intussen ís op 25 mei j.l. verschenen:
Spinoza’s Ethics,
published in 1677, is considered his greatest work and one of history’s most influential philosophical
books. This volume brings established scholars together with new voices to
engage with the complex system of philosophy Spinoza proposed in his
masterpiece. Topics including identity, thought, free will, perfection, and the
affects are all addressed, as individual chapters investigate the key themes of
the Ethics and combine to offer readers a fresh and
thought-provoking view of the work as a whole. Written in a clear and
accessible style, this volume sets out cutting-edge research that reflects,
challenges, and promotes the most recent scholarly advances in the field of
Spinoza studies, tackling old issues and bringing to light new subjects for
debate.
Contents
Introduction - Yitzhak Y. Melamed [PDF]
1 The Indiscernibility of
Identicals and the Transitivity of Identity in Spinoza’s Logic of the
Attributes - Don Garrett [ pdf op BookSC ]
2 Spinoza and Maimonides on
Teleology and Anthropocentrism - Warren Zev Harvey [PDF op BookSC ]
5 The “Physical” Interlude - Alison Peterman [ PDF op BookSC ]
6 The Causes of Our Belief in
Free Will: Spinoza on Necessary, “Innate,” yet False Cognition - Yitzhak Y. Melamed [PDF ook op Booksc ]
7 Conatus ‘- John Carriero [ PDF OP bOOKSC ]
8 Scientia Intuitiva in
the Ethics - Kristin Primus [ PDF op BookSC ]
9 “Causa Conscientiae” in
Spinoza’s Ethics - Lia Levy [ PDF op BookSC]
10 Spinoza on the Association of
Affects and the Workings of the Human Mind - Lisa Shapiro [ PDF op BookSC ]
11 The Terminology of the Affects
in Ethics Parts III through V - Pina Totaro [PDF op BOOKSC ]
12 Moral Realism in Spinoza’s Ethics - Colin Marshall [PDF op BookSC ]
13 Spinoza and the Metaphysics of
Perfection - Samuel Newlands [PDF op BookSC ]
14 The Free Man and the Free
Market: Ethics, Politics, and Economics in Spinoza’s Ethics IV - Beth Lord [ PDF op BOOKSC]
15 Spinoza and the Power of
Reason - Michael LeBuffe [ PDF op BookSC ]
Bibliography [ PDF op BookSC ]
Het boek begint met vraagstukken rond de zgn.
identiteitstheorie van Spinoza: hoofdstuk 1 van Don Garret, “The
Indiscernibility of Identicals and the Transitivity of Identity in Spinoza’s
Logic of the Attributes.” Maar hoezo zou de stelling dat de menselijke geest
"een en hetzelfde ding is" als het menselijke lichaam, hetzelfde zou zijn als de volledige identiteit
stellen? Vooral niet daar degenen die er een identiteitsthese in lezen, erop uitkomen
Spinoza te laten zeggen dat lichamelijkheid en denken hetzelfde zijn. En dat
doet Spinoza met zijn nadruk op causale en conceptuele gescheidenheid van
attributen bepaald niet.
Andrea Sangiacomo besprak Spinoza's ‘Ethics'. A Critical Guide in: Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol 56, Number 2, April 2018, p. 373 [ cf. PDF op BookSC ] en begon aldus: "This new Cambridge Critical Guide to Spinoza’s Ethics offers an extensive, thought-provoking, and up-to-date state of the scholarly conversation that surrounds one of Spinoza’s most studied masterpieces."
_ _ _
Abstract:
This thesis investigates Spinoza's mind-body theory starting with the discussion of the diverse interpretations of his mind-body theory such as hylomorphism., idealism, epiphenomenalism, and materialism. From the critical comments on inadequacies of these interpretations, it turns out that Spinoza's argument of the relationship between the mind and the body should be understood as holding that there is a non-causal relationship between the mind and the body and that they have equal weight.
Toegift
Ethics Index
General Index
_ _ _
Hierbij wijs ik tevens nog op een dissertatie van
Sam-Yel Park, A study
of the mind-body theory in Spinoza. PhD thesis. Department of Philosophy,
University of Glasgow, 1999 [PDF]Abstract:
This thesis investigates Spinoza's mind-body theory starting with the discussion of the diverse interpretations of his mind-body theory such as hylomorphism., idealism, epiphenomenalism, and materialism. From the critical comments on inadequacies of these interpretations, it turns out that Spinoza's argument of the relationship between the mind and the body should be understood as holding that there is a non-causal relationship between the mind and the body and that they have equal weight.
Although the parallelistic interpretation is compatible with
the above understandings, we cannot ascribe traditional parallelism to Spinoza.
His parallelism is derived ftom his argument of identity between the mind and
the body, which is basedo n his substancen ionism.a nd attribute dualism.W e
should therefore understand Spinoza's mind-body theory as an identity theory
which leads to a parallel relationship between the mind and the body. Since the
double aspect theory argues both identity and parallelism between the mind and
the body, the doctrine we should ascribe to Spinoza is the double aspect
theory.
Furthermore, owing to the fact that Spinoza maintains
substance monism and attribute dualism (assuming an objective view of the
attributes of thought and extension, which are distinct), there is, in
Spinoza's theory, an identity between mental and physical events while there is
no identity between mental and physical properties: the mental and the physical
events are one and the same event described under mental and physical
properties, respectively. From the fact that Spinoza finds identity in
individuals or events, but not in properties, it follows that his theory should
also be understood as a kind of token identity theory.
There are difficulties in this interpretation. Spinoza tries
to combine mind-body identity with the separation of attributes, but some have
argued that the identity would threaten the doctrine that thought and extension
are causally separate. Again, some have argued that if the attributes are
distinct then a substance has more than one essence while if they are not
really distinct, but only seen as distinct, then even God cannot know the true
nature of reality. It is difficult to render Spinoza's claims both consistent
and plausible, but I have tried to find arguments for some of Spinoza's claims
in this area: my interpretation of Spinoza's mind-body theory entails both
token identity and property (or conceptual) parallelism whilst ruling out type
identity as well as substance parallelism. So, I have called Spinoza's
mind-body theory a token double aspect theory.
Spinoza's discussion of the representative nature of ideas
does not sit easily with his doctrine of parallelism, at least so far as finite
beings are concerned, I have tried to make the doctrines consistent, but
ultimately Spinoza seems to bring his representationalism and parallelism into
line by appealing to the confused nature of human ideas.
Despite all the problems, Spinoza's thought on mind and body
has seemed to many to promise real insight into the nature of mind and body,
and I have tried to see how far modern versions of materialism (anomalous
monism), person theory, and some developments in cognitive science can be said
to follow strands in Spinoza's work.
Cf. Dubbel-aspecttheorie op wiki
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