Seymour N. Feldman over Yirmiyahu Yovel’s SPINOZA AND OTHER HERETICS

Seymour N. Feldman doceerde filosofie en gaf cursussen in klassieke joodse filosofie aan de Rutgers University in New Jersey van 1963 tot z’n pensionering. Hij verzorgde de redactie van en de inleiding bij de vertaling door Samuel Shirley van The Ethics and selected letters [Hackett, 1982], van de Emendation of the Intellect (1992) en de Theological-Political Treatise (second edition, 1998). Hij vertaalde Levi ben Gershom’s (Gersonides) The Wars of the Lord (1984–99) en schreef de monografie Philosophy in a Time of Crisis. Don Isaac Abravanel: Defender of the Faith [Taylor & Francis Ltd, oktober 2002] en de monografie Gersonides. Judaism within the Limits of Reason [The Littman Libaryy of Jewish Civilisation, 2010]. Verder schreef hij een aantal artikelen, vooral over klassiek joodse filosofie. [Cf.]

Hier vind ik vooral interessant te verwijzen naar de uitvoerige en interessante bespreking die hij schreef voor de New York Times op 18 maart 1990 van Yirmiyahu Yovel, SPINOZA AND OTHER HERETICS [Volume One: The Marrano of Reason; Volume Two: The Adventures of Immanence. N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989]. Dit review is bij de NYT te lezen – ik heb de tekst hierna overgenomen.

 

Twee jaar later wijdde Inquiry het door de Scandinavian University Press uitgegeven blad, het eerste (maart-) nummer van de jaargang 35 in z’n geheel aan deze uit twee delen bestaande Spinoza and Other Heretics. Als eerste verscheen daarin

• Seymour Feldman: « Spinoza: a marrano of Reason? », p. 37-48.

• Henry E. Allison: « Spinoza and the philosophy of immanence : a reflection on Yovel's The adventures of immanence », p. 55-67.

• Richard Schacht: « Adventures of Immanence Revisited », p. 69-80

• Yirmiyahu Yovel: « Spinoza and other heretics: reply to critics », p. 81-112.

Voor ’t volgende baseer ik mij op de samenvatting die verscheen in het door de Facultés jésuites de Paris uitgegeven BULLETIN DE BIBLIOGRAPHIE SPINOZISTE XV (okt-dec. 1993).

Seymour Feldman zet vraagtekens bij de hoofdthese van het eerste deel, n.l. over de invloed die het marranisme zou hebben gehad op Spinoza. Verwijzend naar Méchoulan, Revah en Yerushalmi, wijst hij op de marginaliteit van heterodoxe marranisme en dat persoonlijkheden zoals Menasseh Ben Israel of Abraham Pereira dicht stonden bij de middeleeuwse joodse mystiek of de ascese die Spinoza zo verachtte. Andere schrijvers, zoals Isaac Orobio de Castro of Isaac Cardoso, stonden veraf van Spinoza's denken, waren daarmee zelfs in volstrekte onenigheid. Volgens Feldman kunnen we daarom niet spreken van marraanse invloeden van auteurs of persoonlijkheden, of zelfs van het 'milieu'. Hij stelt dan ook voor om andere mogelijke invloeden opnieuw te bestuderen (Collegianten en Quakers).
In een tweede deel behandelt Feldman de afsluitende hoofdstukken waarin Yovel de stijl van Spinoza en ’t specifieke van zijn zoektocht naar redding beschouwt. Volgens Feldman is enerzijds de twijfelachtigheid van de stijl of taal niet zo uitgesproken (vooral in de Ethica niet) als Yovel het graag zou willen zien en dat anderzijds deze vorm van schrijven niet bijzonder gemarmerd is en al te vinden is bij Al Farrabi, Averroes en Maimonides.
Tot slot plaatst hij vraagtekens bij de analyse van de mos geometricus (die hij niet ziet als een metafoor), de verticale en horizontale causaliteit (intuïtie zou niet complementair zijn aan de rede), de Natura naturata en Natura naturans, waarbij Feldman door het analyseren van de zoektocht naar redding en gelukzaligheid sinds Aristoteles concludeert dat Spinoza veel dichter in de filosofische traditie stond dan in het marranisme.

In zijn repliek reageert Yovel op Feldmans kritiek door te proberen aan te tonen dat hij zich vergist en de transformatie van Spinoza's marraanse kant van de wereld van religie naar de wereld van de rede negeert, en ten tweede door de diversiteit van de marraanse cultuur als centraal thema van zijn proefschrift niet te herkennen, en geen aandacht schenken aan de structuren en mentale analyses waarop veel van Yovels argumentatie is gebaseerd. Yovel maakt ook van de gelegenheid gebruik om de methodologische grenzen van zijn studie vast te stellen: wat het boek doet en wat het niet doet.

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Tot zover die tweede besprekingsronde. Hierna grijp ik graag terug naar die eerste bespreking van Seymour Feldman in de NYT, die ik hierna  overneem. Ik heb veel bewondering voor Yovels boek, dat ik in Duitse vertaling bezit, maar kan mij zeer wel vinden in de meeste opmerkingen van Feldman.

SEYMOUR FELDMAN, “A DURABLE HERESY”

Review of Yirmiyahu Yovel, SPINOZA AND OTHER HERETICS. Volume One: The Marrano of Reason. 244 pp; Volume Two: The Adventures of Immanence. 225 pp. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. [Volume One, $24.50. Volume Two, $29.50. $45 the set.]

In 1492, following a century of massacres and forced conversions, the Jews of Spain who refused to become Christians were expelled. Out of the conversion campaign there emerged a new phenomenon in Spanish and Jewish history: some of the new converts, or Marranos, preserved a hidden Jewish life and identity.

It is the argument of ''Spinoza and Other Heretics,'' Yirmiyahu Yovel's erudite and important work on Baruch Spinoza, the 17th-century Dutch philosopher who was the child of Marrano parents, that the Marrano mentality was a major factor in the formation of Spinoza's personality and philosophy. And, in turn, insofar as Spinoza's thought influenced modern philosophy, this Marrano character pervades much of our own culture, especially among those who have been influenced by such thinkers as Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, whom Mr. Yovel calls ''heretical.'' Although there is a very fine chapter on Spinoza's philosophical style and language and a superb study of one of his salient ideas, salvation through knowledge, Mr. Yovel's book focuses on Spinoza's antecedents and his influence.

Building upon and extending the research of a number of European and Israeli scholars who have revealed the Marrano context of Spinoza's background and of his excommunication from Judaism, Mr. Yovel gives us a fascinating and richly textured picture of 17th-century Jewish Amsterdam. It is now well established that there were heterodox elements in the Jewish community and that Spinoza was not alone. Along with two others, Spinoza was excommunicated in 1656 for ''unorthodox'' practices. Since the announcement of the ban is vague, scholars have been trying to give a more detailed picture of the reasons for it.

It is Mr. Yovel's thesis that Spinoza and his colleagues in heresy had developed a ''philosophy of immanence'' that was thoroughly incompatible not only with traditional Judaism, even in its own considerable diversity, but inimical to all historical religions that are based on a dualistic concept of God and the world. This philosophy of immanence was joined with a certain literary and philosophical style of semantic dissimulation, giving rise to a specific genre of discourse, the Marrano ''dual language,'' which had been developed by Spinoza's Marrano predecessors to enable them to say what they wanted to without revealing too openly their true thoughts or identity. As what Mr. Yovel calls a ''Marrano of reason,'' Spinoza used this dual language both to undermine the traditional belief in a transcendent God and to convert others to the philosophy of immanence, which is neatly summed up in Spinoza's famous formula: God, or Nature.

Since Spinoza's God is not encountered in any supernatural revelation but in nature, the way to know and love this deity is different from the rituals of traditional religion. Whereas Spinoza's Marrano father would have said that salvation is in the law of Moses and not in the law of Jesus, Spinoza sought salvation in reason. Mr. Yovel gives us an insightful analysis of Spinoza's notion of intuitive cognition, the highest level of knowledge whereby the knower attains ''blessedness,'' or salvation, and does it in this life.

Realizing that this goal was too difficult for everyone to achieve, Spinoza enunciated a twofold message: a religion for the multitude purified of its inessential, false and dangerous elements; and a philosophy for those able to pursue the life of pure reason. Those attaining the latter would have to live a Marrano-like existence, since they would be out of tune with the majority who still thought in terms of traditional religion.

Although Mr. Yovel has made an important contribution to the understanding of Spinoza by providing us with such a detailed description of the Marrano world in which Spinoza was born and educated, I do not share his conviction that this Marrano mind-set was ''the fundamental'' influence on Spinoza. That Spinoza was an ''immanentist'' is correct; that he came to this philosophical position as a result of his Marrano heritage is unconvincing. Most Marranos who were able to escape from the Inquisition in Spain returned to the Jewish community as faithful Jews; only a small minority found the reconversion difficult.

Spinoza's immanentism is better understood as the logical outcome of his own philosophical critique of the medieval Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides and Spinoza's contemporary, the French Christian philosopher Rene Descartes, the two men with whose doctrines he was most familiar. The difficulties in traditional philosophical and theological dualism led Spinoza to reject this approach and to develop the alternative philosophy of monism, or immanentism. The Marrano environment and experience had very little to do with this.

In the second volume of Mr. Yovel's study the focus shifts to the history of modern thought, especially the major figures from Kant through Freud. Mr. Yovel argues that these modern thinkers all share or reflect several important themes or projects drawn from Spinoza. In short, they are ''heretics'' or revealers of a ''dark enlightenment,'' according to which man is not a temporary citizen of this world to be transported eventually to a different domain where his true salvation lies; instead, the only world is this one. The major modern thinkers are disciples of Spinoza insofar as they advocate some form of ''secular salvation,'' or ''immanentism.'' Mr. Yovel's discussions of Nietzsche and Freud are most illuminating and stimulating. In an epilogue he presents his own version of the philosophy of immanence in which Spinoza's metaphysical moralism is tempered with Freud's more sober therapeutic approach. The ''dogmatic'' philosophy of Spinoza is replaced with a ''critical'' philosophy of immanence in which finitude, tolerance and pluralism are the main motifs.

At the end of Volume One, Mr. Yovel raises the questions of Spinoza's Jewishness and his significance for Jewish history. Was Spinoza ''the first secular Jew''? Indeed, was he the first secularist? There is no doubt that secularism was an integral component of Spinoza's social philosophy. He advocated a society in which religion was to be a private matter and freedom of and from religion was guaranteed. But, Mr. Yovel reminds us, in that age Spinoza could not live as a secularist. He was a ''Marrano of reason,'' who lived in a society in which one was either a Christian or a Jew. He was neither and he cautiously taught a philosophy that undermined both. Society was not ready for him.

There was no place for Spinoza as a secular Jew in 17th-century Amsterdam or in any other Jewish community. In this respect he had to be banned from the Jewish community. Yet, Spinoza's philosophy of secular salvation has become a main theme in modern Jewish thought and life, especially among the early Zionists, who saw in Spinoza their forerunner. Of course, Spinoza was not a Zionist, in spite of his admission that the revival of a Jewish state in their ancestral land would not be impossible, if the Jews would throw off the ''emasculating'' elements of Judaism. Spinoza perceived the normality of Jewish existence in its ancient homeland and its abnormality in the centuries of exile, especially as expressed in anti-Semitism. In this sense Spinoza stimulated several early Zionist thinkers, such as Moses Hess, to think practically about the ''return to Zion.''

Today many Jews have chosen to live secular lives without abandoning their Jewish identity. Spinoza could not, but he provided the philosophical rationale for doing so. It is not without interest or irony that today the state of Israel is one of the more important centers for Spinoza studies. Mr. Yovel is himself the director of the International Spinoza Institute in Jerusalem. I wonder what the ''eternal essence'' of Spinoza would think of this turn of events.