Henri Bergson (1859 -1941) en #Spinoza – een aanvulling

 

Naar aanleiding van het verschijnen van een nieuwe vertaling van

Henri Bergson, De creatieve evolutie. Vertaald door Joke van Zijl. Leusden: ISVW Uitgevers, 2019 - zie daarover Mark Leegsma “Waarom Bergson?" in de nieuwe i-Filosofie #44 - PDF

breng ik graag dit blog ter aanvulling op het blog van 08-07-2014: "Henri Bergson (1859 -1941) had ambivalente houding t.o.v. Spinoza." Aan de aldaar gegeven bibliografie voeg ik graag het volgende toe:

Gregory Dale Adamson reviewde Henri Bergson: Evolution, time and philosophy. In: World Futures: The Journal of New Paradigm Research, Vol 54 [1999], #2, 135-162

Abstract: Evolutionary theory is hindered by the conflict between the apparently antagonistic principles of its two founding figures, Darwin and Lamarck. Bergson's Creative Evolution outlines the means of transcending this impasse. If the evolutionary process is conceived as enduring then the atomistic model of static genetic states is never fully realisable. In the light of this, Bergson considers the germ‐plasm to be essentially “fluid.” If there is to be influence on the germ‐line it will be primarily in terms of the manner in which the genetic data is unfolded. In order to designate this influence Bergson introduces the concept of the “tendency.” The tendency will be explicated in relation to contemporary evolutionary biology. However, as the concept signifies that which is given only in the duration in which information is elaborated, it is precluded from representation. Bergson demonstrates that it is the evolutionary principle of continuous transformation which constitutes the limit to any scientific of view. For this reason, science needs to be complemented by a philosophical account of the duration of process.” [cf. tandfonline, cf. PDF op BookSC]

Hiernaar verwijs ik daar een jaar later van dezelfde auteur verscheen:

Gregory Dale Adamson, “Bergson's spinozist tendencies,” in: Philosophy Today 44 [2000], #1, 73-85 [cf.] Het artikel begint aldus:

In a letter to Léon Brunschvicg declining an invitation to attend a conference commemorating the 250th anniversary of the death of Spinoza, Bergson wrote: "One could say that all philosophers have two philosophies: their own and that of Spinoza."¹ It could be said that Bergson's "own" philosophy is the reconception of time following the emergence of evolution as a science and the discovery of entropy as an irreversible process. As the above quotation suggests, however, Bergson's thought on time must be seen as taking place from "within" Spinozism. In this respect, his entire oeuvre can be regarded as an effort to rethink "substance" as an evolving or, in Bergson's terms, "enduring" thing. In accordance with this, in The Creative Mind Bergson describes duration as; "substantial, indivisible insofar as it is pure duration" but adds that "the permanence of substance [is] ... a continuity of change."² Broadly speaking, Bergsonism can be seen as the reconfiguration of Spinozism post Darwin and in the light of Boltzmann: that is, as thinking immanence given evolution, entropy, and irreversible time.

With the introduction of change as the only "eternal" aspect of substance, the Spinozian conception of immanent causation, as the expression of invariant causes, requires revision. Bergson provides this with his concept of the virtual "tendency." The tendency signifies an immanent, productive mode of causality where change itself is causa sui. This transformation, however, alters both the relation between Spinoza's natura naturata (nature according to its products or modes) and natura naturans (nature itself as a "thinking thing" [SIC]), and the relation between the attributes of extension and thought. Bergson suggests that if time is incorporated into substance the effect for him on Spinozism is to accept "his philosophy as it is, on the side of Extension, but to mutilate it on the side of Thought."³ Departing from Spinoza, Bergson draws a qualitative distinction between extension and thought, defining them as the antagonistic tendencies of persistence and change. As thought and extension are no longer "parallel," Bergson distinguishes two equally qualitatively differing forms of "common notions": those derived from extension and those expressed in duration.

The aim of what follows will be to read Bergson beside Spinoza, not only to reveal his indebtedness to Spinoza but, in accordance with the intricate nature of Spinoza's ontology, to indicate a far greater complexity and coherence to Bergson's thought than has been observed by most commentators thus far. Problems such as the exclusivity of the intellect and intuition, the conflict between science and philosophy and the supposed dichotomy of matter and memory, can all be dispelled when they are seen as attributes of a single enduring substance. Further to this, in reading Bergson next to Spinoza, the beginnings of the first ontological understanding of the implications of Darwin's intuition that nature thinks itself can be discerned. If Spinoza presents the problem of the immanence of substance to thought, Bergson adds the further complication of the immanence of change within thought itself. And, as Bergson repeatedly stated, this is the great "unthought" of both philosophy and science. For what the limits of scientific and philosophical deduction reveal is that nature does not think like us. The "revolution" that Bergson insists philosophy must undertake is to relinquish the quest to grasp the movement of change in thought and to conceive the apprehension and expression of change as thought.

Essential Freedom

The term "tendency" is first employed in Time and Free Will as a means of critiquing the idea of "free will" without resorting to either determinism or chance. For the most part, Bergson's critique replicates Spinoza's. In the Ethics Spinoza refutes the Cartesian idea of a will distinct from, and governing, the body. His argument is primarily ontological: where Descartes' held that the mind and body are two distinct "substances," the former determining, or acting on the latter, Spinoza conceived of a single substance which expresses its modifications (affectiones) through the attributes of "extension" and "thought. …[cf.]  

Tenslotte wijs ik op:

Lionel Astesiano, Joie et Liberté chez Bergson et Spinoza. Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2016. - 458 pp.

En affirmant que « tout philosophe a deux philosophies : la sienne et celle de Spinoza », Bergson exprime avant tout que le philosophe se doit de rompre avec une pensée dogmatique qui n’a plus lieu d’être et que Spinoza incarne tout particulièrement. Le spinozisme manifeste la pente de l’intelligence lorsqu’elle suit sa logique propre sans être rectifiée par le recours à l’expérience. Or, c’est cette démarche systématique que la philosophie doit désormais abandonner. 
Bergson est néanmoins hanté par la pensée de Spinoza et le rapport qu’il entretient avec lui, en particulier dans ses cours au Collège de France, met en évidence un lien bien plus complexe et subtil qu’un simple rapport d’opposition. Contre la tendance à la clôture et à la systématicité, Bergson va alors privilégier chez Spinoza la tendance à l’ouverture et au mysticisme. En mettant en lumière cet aspect, cet ouvrage montre la sympathie intellectuelle qui réunit ces penseurs autour des notions de joie et de liberté. C’est pourquoi la figure du Christ va constituer un modèle non seulement éthique mais ontologique. Le terme de mysticisme, chez ces deux auteurs, ne désigne ni le refus de l’expérience ni celui des sciences positives mais renvoie à un rationalisme élargi jusqu’à l’amour du réel.