James Sikkema’s PhD-thesis over #Spinoza’s “Virtual Mereology”

Ik kom op dit blog via deze dia in Philip Turetzky’s Spinoza-course 17th-18th Century Philosophy [cf. academia.edu]

“[A] virtual whole…is understood to be a unique particular that is neither composed out of nor divisible into proper parts.  It is neither the sum of its parts, nor is it something other than its parts.  It is itself a power (virtu) expressing itself in different ways in different regions of itself.  Its parts are, therefore, themselves powers that are inseparable from the whole and are only distinguishable within it by their capacities [what they can do]… a virtual whole is a unique power whose parts are inseparable from it and are only distinguished according to their capacities to act in a certain way… A virtual whole exists as acting; that is, its activity is indivisible from its being (IP 34-5; IP 17c2).”

James Sikkema “A Virtual  Whole? Spinoza on the
Nature of Infinity and the Infinity of Nature”

Dit deed mij verder zoeken naar deze James Sikkema. Een artikel met precies bovenstaande titel vond ik niet, maar wel andere en vooral zijn dissertatie.

Over James L. Sikkema

https://philpeople.org/profiles/james-sikkema

https://mcmaster.academia.edu/JamesSikkema

Zijn CV: https://mcmaster.academia.edu/JamesSikkema/CurriculumVitae  

Sikkema promoveerde op

James L. Sikkema, Virtual Mereology: Power, Affect, and Relation in Spinoza's 'Ethics'. PhD-thesis, McMaster University, June 2015 -[cf. McMaster University, aldaar PDF te downloaden]

LAY ABSTRACT: This thesis explores some basic questions: 1) what is the essence of existing things? 2) On what do such things, both causally and conceptually, depend for their existence? 3) How are these things basically related? 4) How can we come to know such things? The thesis enlists Baruch Spinoza's Ethics to help find answers to these questions. In doing so it forges a novel interpretation of Spinoza's mature philosophy by answering the questions thus: 1) The essence of any existing thing is the power to both be and act. 2) Any finite thing that exists depends for its existence on that which has the power to exist and act absolutely infinitely. 3) This dependence relation is mereological in nature; i.e. things are parts of the whole infinite power of existing 4) We know these things by understanding our own particular power of activity.

Abstract: This dissertation offers a novel interpretation of the metaphysical system Spinoza presents in his Ethics by considering it entirely in terms of power, affectivity and part/whole relations. I begin by arguing that the central concern of the Ethics is what I term ‘the problem of passivity’. Namely, if as part of nature, we are necessarily always subject to passive emotions, we could seemingly not become active to the point of adequate conception without ceasing to be a part of Nature. I argue that adequate conception, rather, requires a mereological conception of oneself as part of the whole of Nature. Since such understanding requires a conception of the whole in which these parts inhere, I explicate Spinoza’s conception of substance as that which enjoys an absolute and infinite power of existence. Inasmuch as this power of existence necessarily involves a coextensive power to act, I then argue that for Spinoza the whole of Nature is defined in terms of power. Consequently, the infinite modifications following from eternal substance ought to be considered as powerful parts of this potestative whole. Individual things are, then, to be defined as dispositional structures manifesting their capacities in interdependent relations. The thesis comes to explain this by using the Medieval mereological category of a ‘virtual whole’ (i.e. a unique particular power whose parts are inseparable from it, and only differentiated according to their own capacities). The dissertation concludes with a suggestion for further research on the possibilities that the presented theory of virtual mereology could have in relation to Spinoza’s ethico-political philosophy.

Sikkema baseert zich sterk, zoals in de voetnoten te zien is, op Deleuze.

In zijn academia-pagina geeft hij meerdere concepten van artikelen. Ik haal er één naar voren:

James Sikkema, "Virtual Mereology: Power, Complexity and Individuation in Spinoza's Ethics." [PDF acadeia.edu]

Abstract: This article presents a novel, albeit speculative, interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics by viewing it through the lens of the Medieval mereological category of a virtual whole and its parts. A virtual whole is a unique, particular power that is neither composed out of nor actually divisible into proper parts, and whose parts are only distinguished by their power of activity. By importing this concept into Spinoza's metaphysics I argue that there are real definitions of part and whole if substance is understood as an absolutely infinite virtual or potestative whole and if modes are, correspondingly, understood as powerful parts inhering in this whole. The essay then enlists this virtual mereological theory to account for the process of individuation.

Zoals boven gezegd, ik heb niet kunnen vinden:

James Sikkema, "A Virtual Whole? Spinoza on the Nature of Infinity an the Infinity of Nature”