Eerste nummer nieuw tijdschrift Symphilosophie met veel #Spinoza

 

SYMPHILOSOPHIE: International Journal of Philosophical Romanticism is an online, open-access and peer-reviewed journal for new academic research on philosophical romanticism.
Er gaat één nummer per jaar verschijnen
SYMPHILOSOPHIE: International Journal of Philosophical Romanticism, Vol 1 (1919) [Cf. & PDF} gaat over Romantiek en Duits Idealisme - dus over de Schlegels, Novalis, Hölderlin e.a. - en hun verwerking van Spinoza.

Ik beveel in het bijzonder aan:

● Alexander J. B. Hampton, Romantic Religion: Dissolution and Transcendence in the Poetics of Hölderlin, pp, 61-73

Focusing upon the thought of Hölderlin, this examination places early German Romanticism in the context of the history of religion, at a time when the religious outlook of the West was undergoing profound change. Hölderlin was concerned with the loss of divine language, which had the capacity to hold together subject and object, self and nature, in a transcendent ground that united both. The loss of this language made these conceptual pairs appear increasingly as antinomies. This was evinced in the popular, but mutually exclusive philosophies of Spinoza and Fichte, which both sought an immanent foundation to replace the loss of the transcendent. A central element of Hölderlin’s poetic project was to find a new language for transcendence in an age of immanence. To do so, he turned not to philosophy or theology, but to poetics, whose rhythmic nature, he argued, was capable of re-presenting transcendence. This examination will begin with a brief historical consideration of the relation of transcendence and immanence, before proceeding to Hölderlin’s consideration of the loss of the language of transcendence, and the need to develop a new one. The final section will examine how Hölderlin aimed to achieve this in his poetics. 

● Rylie Johnson, From Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre to Novalis’ Poetic Historicity, pp. 105-127

Ik citeer Note 8: Why Fichte? Novalis’ philosophical thought was largely informed by his studies on Fichte. It is for this reason that, according to Frederick C. Beiser, Novalis was for a long time dismissed as simply constructing a “poetic version of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre.” Today, however, Novalis is recognized as a thinker in his own right who was quite critical of Fichte’s system. For Beiser, Novalis belongs to the tradition of absolute idealism, pre-dating and anticipating both Schelling’s and Hegel’s respective systems. Specifically, Novalis criticizes Fichte for his reduction of the absolute to the “I,” and sought to “synthesize Fichte and Spinoza” through an appeal to an absolute qua God. However, this point is not uncontested. Hence, in her book The Romantic Absolute, Dalia Nassar criticizes Beiser for rendering the romantic project into a kind of Spinozism; obscuring the romantic investment in constructing the “I” in a manner consistent with Fichte. As such, Novalis’ philosophical projecting onsists in realizing God in the world through the activity of the “I,” but not in a matter of striving; a task, which, unlike Nassar or Beiser, this article seeks to show, is necessarily historical in nature. See: Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 420; Dalia Nassar, The Romantic Absolute: Being and Knowing in Early German Romantic Philosophy, 1795-1804 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014), 11.