Het
blog van gisteren, “Spinozisme (met z’n niet-vrije wil):
wijsheid of waanzin?” dat deels een voortzetting was van het blog van donderdag
1 februari 2018,
“Het is voor de praktijk van het leven beter, ja noodzakelijk, de dingen als
mogelijk te beschouwen" (TTP H.4), is daar een illustratie van. Om niet
alle onderscheidingen en posities opnieuw uit te hoeven vinden, verwijs ik
hierbij nog eens op dit boek (de openingszin van de inleiding nam ik als titel
van dit blog):
Ursula
Goldenbaum & Christopher Kluz (Eds.), Doing
Without Free Will. Spinoza and Contemporary Moral Problems. Lexington Books, oktober 2015 - 164 pagina's – books.google
waar de volledige uitgebreide inleiding van de redacteuren te lezen is; [eerder
kondigde ik dit boek aan in dit blog]
TOC
Introduction: Doing without Free Will: Spinoza and Contemporary Moral Problems, Ursula Goldenbaum and Christopher Kluz
Chapter 1. Moral Responsibility Without Free Will: Spinoza’s Social Approach, Christopher Kluz
Chapter 2. Recovering Spinoza’s Theory of Akrasia, Julia Haas
Chapter 3. Spinoza’s Evolutionary Foundation of Moral Values and their Objectivity: Neither Relativism nor Absolutism, Ursula Goldenbaum
Chapter 4. Rehumanizing Spinoza’s Free Man, Matthew HomaChapter 5. Freedom from Resentment: Spinoza’s Way with the Reactive Attitudes, J. Thomas Cook
Introduction: Doing without Free Will: Spinoza and Contemporary Moral Problems, Ursula Goldenbaum and Christopher Kluz
Chapter 1. Moral Responsibility Without Free Will: Spinoza’s Social Approach, Christopher Kluz
Chapter 2. Recovering Spinoza’s Theory of Akrasia, Julia Haas
Chapter 3. Spinoza’s Evolutionary Foundation of Moral Values and their Objectivity: Neither Relativism nor Absolutism, Ursula Goldenbaum
Chapter 4. Rehumanizing Spinoza’s Free Man, Matthew HomaChapter 5. Freedom from Resentment: Spinoza’s Way with the Reactive Attitudes, J. Thomas Cook
Abstract: Doing without
Free Will: Spinoza and Contemporary Moral Problems introduces Spinoza into
the contemporary discussion on free will and on moral problems surrounding this
discussion. Traditional Western moral philosophy, for the most part, has been
built on the assumption of free will as a special human capacity to freely
choose actions without being determined in that choice. This idea draws
increasing critique, fueled recently especially by the ever new findings of
neuroscience. But how can we develop a moral philosophy without free will?
Spinoza
faced a similar challenge when writing his Ethics during the rise of modern
science and its deterministic model of nature and, for this reason, has much to
offer the current discussion. Not only does he provide a foundation for
understanding moral responsibility without free will, he also provides an
explanation and solution to the classical problem of akrasia precisely because
he argues the will is not free. He worked out an entirely new system of moral
philosophy that can help resolve the meta-ethical dilemma between absolutism
and relativism, showing how moral values evolve naturally within society.
Despite
denying the traditional God-like power of "free will" Spinoza
developed a robust concept of freedom, one that is distinctly human and viable
today. His modernity comes to light when we look at his answers to the much
discussed questions whether it is possible or even desirable to develop
objective instead of reactive attitudes toward our fellow human beings. His
answers, perhaps surprisingly, resemble positions held by some contemporary
philosophers.
Ook verwijs ik nog naar dit boek:
Heidi Miriam Ravven, The Self Beyond Itself. An Alternative History of Ethics, the New Brain Sciences, and the Myth of Free Will. The New Press, 2013 – books.google.
Zie daarover mijn enthousiaste bespreking in 't blog van 25-05-2016, "Aanrader: Heidi M. Ravven, The Self Beyond Itself." En 't blog van 26-05-2016: Enig commentaar op Heidi M. Ravven's The Self Beyond Itself en weer veel waardering.
cf. ook
* * *
Ook verwijs ik nog naar dit boek:Heidi Miriam Ravven, The Self Beyond Itself. An Alternative History of Ethics, the New Brain Sciences, and the Myth of Free Will. The New Press, 2013 – books.google.
Zie daarover mijn enthousiaste bespreking in 't blog van 25-05-2016, "Aanrader: Heidi M. Ravven, The Self Beyond Itself." En 't blog van 26-05-2016: Enig commentaar op Heidi M. Ravven's The Self Beyond Itself en weer veel waardering.
cf. ook
Keith Green,
Review of Heidi M. Ravven, The Self Beyond Itself: An Alternative History of
Ethics, The New Brain Sciences, and the Myth of Free Will, (New York, The New
Press, 2013). (Iyyun 63, July 2014) [ academia.edu]
Iets moois,
BeantwoordenVerwijderenAs intelligent participants in the ongoing “freedom versus brain sciences” debate have noted, the problem should not be reduced to the dilemma “is the (deterministic) natural causal link complete, or is there a gap in it which allows an opening for a free act?”, as it often is by those philosophers who think that, once one “proves”— through a vague reference to quantum physics, as a rule—that there is a genuine indeterminacy/contingency in nature, freedom is thereby possible, its space “ontologically guaranteed.” It was Daniel Dennett who pointed out, against this line of reasoning, that one can easily imagine a universe in which genuine chance has its place, but there is no freedom: even if my decision to do something or not (say, to stop writing at this moment) is genuinely not fully covered by the preceding causal networks, it is not a “free act” if it means only that a purely mechanical contingency (like tossing a coin) tipped my decision in one direction or another. “Freedom” is not simply the opposite of deterministic causal necessity: as Kant knew, it means a specific mode of causality, the agent’s self-determination. There is in fact a kind of Kantian antinomy of freedom: if an act is fully determined by preceding causes, it is, of course, not free; if, however, it depends on the pure contingency which momentarily severs the full causal chain, it is also not free. The only way to resolve this antinomy is to introduce a secondlevel reflexive causality: I am determined by causes (be it direct brute natural causes or motivations), and the space of freedom is not a magic gap in this first-level causal chain but my ability retroactively to choose/determine which causes will determine me. “Ethics,” at its most elementary, stands for the courage to accept this responsibility.