#Spinoza’s teleologie-kritiek. Is Spinoza 'volkomen verstoken van teleologie'? *

Spinoza enjoys a widespread reputation as
the early modern philosopher who makes
the most thoroughgoing and principled
attack on teleology. [Martin Lin, cf. onder]

Let wel: de term 'teleologie' kende Spinoza nog niet: dat is een 18e eeuwse uitvinding (geïntroduceerd door Christiaan Wolff in 1728).**)

Een recent artikel van Melamed, waarop Ferdie Fluitsma mij wees (waarvoor mijn dank), werd voor mij aanleiding om de secundaire Spinoza-literatuur over “Spinoza en teleologie” hier bijeen te brengen. Ik breng de relevante publicaties zoveel mogelijk op datum van verschijnen en – waar mogelijk – met een link naar waar de tekst te lezen is [wat in elf van de negentien teksten het geval is].

De belangrijkste plaats waar Spinoza tegen het bestaan van doeloorzaken in God of de natuur spreekt, is zoals bekend in de Appendix van deel I van de Ethica. Bij al wat gebeurt, spelen alleen voorafgaande bewerkende oorzaken en spelen doelen absoluut geen rol.
Spinoza's punt: hoe kan een doel, dat op z'n best pas gerealiseerd kan worden aan het eind van een proces, causaal verantwoordelijk zijn voor dit proces?
Dit gold voor hem ook voor menselijk handelen – d.w.z. ook in het geval van willen, wensen en verlangen (we verlangen niet naar iets omdat het goed is - en zo ons doel kan zijn -, maar we noemen iets goed, omdat we ernaar streven).

Waarschijnlijk omdat dit als contra-intuïtief wordt ervaren en niet alleen gewone mensen maar ook filosofen uitgaan van hun fenomenologische ervaring dat we als mens wél doelen nastreven en een wil ervaren, is het dat deze metafysische benadering van Spinoza zo vaak ofwel bekritiseerd werd, ofwel dat men probeert aan te tonen dat Spinoza het niet zo ernstig meent en via zijn leer van de conatus toch meer doelgerichtheid introduceert. En dat heeft geleid tot veel studies, die ik hierna opsom.

 

• Jonathan Bennett, “Teleology and Spinoza's Conatus.” In: Midwest Studies In Philosophy, Vol 8, 1983, pp. 143-160 [PDF]

• Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics. Hackett Publishing, 1984, m.n. Chapter 9 Goals met de§§: § 50 The denial of divine purpose; § 51 The denial of all purpose; § 52 Spinozas substitute for purpose; § 53 A theory of teleology   – delen op books.google

• Lee C. Rice, “Spinoza, Bennett, and Teleology.” In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 23, No 2, [1985], pp. 241-253 [PDF]

• Edwin Curley, “On Bennett's Spinoza: The Issue of Teleology.” In: Edwin Curley & Pierre-François Moreau (Eds.), Spinoza: Issues and directions: The Proceedings of the Chicago Spinoza Conference (1986: Chicago, Ill.) [Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, #14]. Leiden: Brill, 1990: pp. 39-52. In z’n geheel te lezen op books.google.

• Jonathan Bennett, “Spinoza and Teleology: A Reply to Curley.” In: Edwin Curley & Pierre-François Moreau (Eds.), Spinoza: Issues and directions: The Proceedings of the Chicago Spinoza Conference (1986: Chicago, Ill.) [Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, #14]. Leiden: Brill, 1990: pp. 53-57. In z’n geheel te lezen op books.google.

• Heidi Ravven, "Notes on Spinoza’s Critique of Aristotle’s Ethics: From Teleology to Process Theory." In: Philosophy and Theology, Volume IV, #1, Fall 1989, pp. 3 –32 [academia.edu]

Abstract 1: I argue that Spinoza’s ethical theory may be viewed as a transformation of Aristotle’s teleological account which has been corrected of several fundamental flaws that Spinoza found in Aristotle. The result of Spinoza’s redefinition of ethical activity is a developmental account of ethics which has close kinship with the views of process theoreticians.
Abstract 2: This paper exposes the proto-biological character of Spinoza's understanding of the activity of mind. It also makes the case that Spinoza was inspired by Aristotle's understanding of the dynamic activity of theoretical reason as fulfillment of the human species in the N.E. and in the Metaphysics.

 

• Kathleen League, “Teleology in Spinoza's 'Ethics'.” In: Southwestern Philosophical Review 8, 1 (1992), 77-83 [cf.]

• Wolfgang Bartuschat, “Teleologie bei Spinoza im Hinblick auf Kant.” In: Jürgen-Eckardt Pleines (Hrsg.), Teleologie. Ein philosophisches Problem in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1994: pp. 98-112. [books.google laat slechts delen lezen]

 

• Charles Jarrett, “Teleology and Spinoza's Doctrine of Final Causes.” In: Yirmiyahu Yovel (Ed.), Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist; Spinoza by 2000 - The Jerusalem Conferences, Ethica III [The Jerusalem Spinoza Institute & The Spinoza Research Program, the Hebrew University]. New York: Little Room Press, 1999: 3-23.

•  Charles Jarrett, "Spinoza on Teleology, Value, and the Unity of Mind". Chapter in: Jon Miller (ed.), Topics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind. Springer, 2009, pp. 131-149 [Cf.]
 

• Don Garrett, “Teleology in Spinoza and Early Modern Rationalism”. In Rocco J. Gennaro & Charles Huenemann [eds.], New Essays on the Rationalists. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 310–335. Deels in books.google. Het artikel is als chapter 12 opgenomen in Garrett’s in 2018 uitgekomen verzamelbundel Nature and necessity in Spinoza's philosophy. Oxford University Press, cf. books.google.

• Richard N. Manning, “Spinoza, thoughtful Teleology, and the causal Significance of Content.” Chapter 4 in: Olli Koistinen & John Biro (eds.), Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes. Oxford [e.a.]: Oxford University Press, 2002: pp. 182-209. [books.google]

• John Carriero, “Spinoza on Final Causality.” Chapter 4 in: Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 2 (2005): pp. 105-148 [bijna de helft, t/m 129, is te lezen op books.google]

• Martin Lin, “Teleology and Human Action in Spinoza.” In: Philosophical Review 115 (2006): pp. 317-354. [PDF en nog een PDF -  door hemzelf intussen naar academia.edu gebracht]

Dit is in mijn ogen te zien als het meest heldere en informatieve artikel over de materie. Hij laat zien dat “menselijke teleologie” of doelgerichtheid volkomen in Spinoza’s systeem past en daarin onmisbaar is.

• Edward Andrew Greetis, "Spinoza's rejection of teleology." In: Revista Conatus: Filosofia De Spinoza, Vol. 4, No 8 - Dezembro 2010, pp. 25-35 [PDF op academia.edu]

• Jeffrey K. McDonough, “The Heyday of Teleology and Early Modern Philosophy,” in John Carriero (ed.), Early Modern Philosophy Reconsidered, Midwest Studies in Philosophy (35) 2011: 179-204. [PDF]  

• Paul Hoffman, “Final Causation in Spinoza.” 

Abstract: John Carriero has argued that for Spinoza there is no final causality in the Aristotelian sense and that the striving of things is merely to be understood in terms of metaphysical inertia. This paper makes a case against this claim. First it is argued that Spinoza's notion of striving does in principle meet Thomas Aquinas' criterion for final causation. Second it is shown that Carriero's denial of final causation in Spinoza leads to a deflationary interpretation of Spinoza's notions of the good and striving of things, which is at odds with many passages of Spinoza's Ethics.O n e can only do justice to these passages if one assumes that Spinoza did accept final causation in the traditional sense. [cf.]

&
 

• Justin Steinberg, “Spinoza on Human Purposiveness and Mental Causation.”
Beide in: Dominik Perler & Stephan Schmidt (Guest Eds.), Final causes and teleological explanations. Paderborn: Mentis [Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, #14 - Special Volume on Teleology], 2011, resp. pp. 40-50 & pp. 51-70. [Steinberg vermeldt 't wel, maar uploadde zijn artikel niet naar zijn academia.edu-pagina]

Uit de PDF van de Introduction van de Guest Editors:

Abstract: Spinoza provides a vivid example of the fact that debates about teleology are fraught with terminological difficulties no matter whether they are led in terms of final causes, teleology or teleonomy. Moreover, the debate about whether or not Spinoza allowed for teleology is a telling example for the importance of history of philosophy in systematic perspective, as the contributors to this volume practice it: the arguments presented by authors in the past need to be carefully reconstructed as answers to a certain set of questions. Very often, one cannot understand what these authors said and thought if one simply looks at singular, isolated passages. Their statements must be read and interpreted in a wider context, and the argumentative role they played in an all-embracing theory must be studied carefully. It is not unusual for a proper systematic analysis of arguments to lead to novel interpretations of historical authors – interpretations that may turn out to be interesting options for solving philosophical problems which are still being discussed. In this vein then, studying the history of philosophy can have a genuine philosophical value. [cf.]

Bovenstaand hoofdstuk van Paul Hoffman is op internet niet (open/vrij) te bereiken. Wel is van hem een hoofdstuk uit een ander boek zeer relevant, waarvan wél een Pdf gepubliceerd is en dat bovendien diep ingaat op Spinoza [lezing aanbevolen]:

• Paul Hoffman, "Does Efficient Causation Presuppose Final Causation? Aquinas vs. Early Modern Mechanism." Chapter 8 in: Samuel Newlands & Larry M. Jorgensen (eds.), Metaphysics and the Good: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams. Oxford University Press, 2009, p.295-312 [PDF]

Aquinas makes a fascinating but ignored argument for a conclusion that might seem preposterous from our contemporary perspective: all efficient causation presupposes final causation. This chapter explains and defends his argument, making the case that it relies on a stripped-down understanding of final causation. On this stripped-down understanding, an outcome counts as an end so long as the cause is aimed at it. An efficient cause is aimed at an outcome provided that it is determined to it in the sense that it tends to that outcome; that is, the outcome would come about provided nothing interferes. It is argued that this conception of final causation is sufficiently robust to be of philosophical interest, and that the mere specification of efficient causal laws entails final causation in this stripped-down but still robust sense. It is also argued that early modern mechanists including Descartes and Spinoza, who are well-known for rejecting final causation in physics, are committed to final causation in this weaker sense, but that they are also committed to an even stronger version of final causation; according to which, bodies are not only aimed at certain outcomes, but strive toward them. [cf.]

• Daniel J. Vecchio, "The Limits to Spinoza's Rejection of Teleology" [DOC - 19 april 2011;  academia.edu]

• Andrea Sangiacomo, “Teleology and Agreement in Nature.” In: André Santos Campos (ed.), Spinoza: Basic Concepts. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2015, pp. 59-70. [PDF op Academia.edu]
 

Cf. het blog van 3 juli 2017: “Spinoza liever mechanicistisch dan teleologisch duiden”, waarin ik verwijs naar mijn kritiek op “Teleology and Agreement in Nature”

• Andrea Sangiacomo, "Aristotle, Heereboord and the polemical target of Spinoza’s critique of teleology." In: Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 54, no. 3 [2016], pp. 395-420 [PDF op Academia.edu]

• Karolina Hübner, “Spinoza's unorthodox metaphysics of the will.” Met name § 2. "Some background: Spinoza's case against teleology." Chapter 16. in: Michael Della Rocca (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza. Oxford University Press, 2017 – books.google   [PDF]  

• Yitzhak Y. Melamed, “Teleology in Jewish Philosophy: Early Talmudists till Spinoza.” Forthcoming in Jeff McDonough, Teleology: A History (Oxford UP) [Academia.edu]
[Oxford University Press, 2020. When we say that eyes are for seeing, have we explained why we have eyes? This volume explores the development of the concept of teleology from ancient times to the present.]

_____________

*) Spinoza is ‘utterly devoid of teleology’ -

Jon Miller, “Spinoza and the Stoics on Substance Monism.” In Olli Koistinen (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’. Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 117

**) Georg Toepfer, Zweckbegriff und Organismus: über die teleologische Beurteilung biologischer Systeme. Königshausen & Neumann, 2004 - books.google