Spinozisme over leven, dood en zelfdoding bij #Spinoza [5]

Vervolg van de in het vorige blog begonnen bibliografie.

• Yitzhak Melamed & Oded Schechter, “Spinoza on Death, ‘Our Present Life’ & the Imagination” [nog nergens gepubliceerd, volgens z’n cv is het “Article under review” [2013], maar dat zou het dan al vijf jaar zijn. Cf. blog van mei 2013 - academia.edu

• Gillian Marian H. Garcia, “Spinoza on Conatus and Suicide.” In: Talisik: An Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy, Volume II, Issue no.1 [2015] – PDF en academia.edu. 

Abstract: Benedict de Spinoza has fashioned his philosophy in such a way that its foundations are tightly knitted with each other, with definitions, propositions, scholium, and corollary to support each arguments across his Ethics. It was found in the third part of his book that the essence of man (and things in general) is conatus or the endeavour of such to self-preservation (E3, P6-7). With this in mind, how does it come to be under the notion of suicide? This paper discusses conatus, suicide, and the possibility of such self-destruction under the light of Spinoza’s doctrine by first defining the concept of each, discussing thoroughly the notion of suicide through both religious and non-religious interpretations, and combining these two concepts to prove that, according to the rational philosopher, suicide is nothing but an external force that overpowers the endeavour of one’s will to self-preserve.

• Alexander García Düttmann, “A Matter of Life and Death: Spinoza and Derrida.” Chapter 14 in: Dimitris Vardoulakis (Ed.), Spinoza Now. University of Minnesota Press, 2011, pp. 351-362

Abstract: This chapter explores the relation between life and death by staging a dialogue between Spinoza and Derrida. Spinoza asserts that a free man fears death least of all. This entails that freedom requires liberation from the affect of fear and, liberation from the bondage of affect—which also means the attainment of wisdom. For Spinoza, freedom as an affirmation of life is nothing other than the acceptance of the law’s necessity—a freeing oneself from the necessity even though that necessity but always in terms of indecision. Derrida also sides with life, which is understood as the infinite deferral of the law, as the suspension of its necessity. From that perspective, the Spinozan position about freedom being the acceptance of the necessity of the law appears thoroughly incompatible with Derrida. [Minisota.universitypres]

Luca Giordano (1634-1705), La muerte de Séneca ca. 1660 - Museo de Arte de Ponce

• Keith Green, “Suicide and Impotentia Animi in light of Spinoza’s Account of Activity”, Philosophy After Nature Conference: Center for the Humanities: Universiteit Utrecht, September 3-5, 2014. [[responding the paper of Steven Barbone & Lee Rice. Vooral schetsmatige aantekeningen op academia.edu geplaatst]

[N.B. Keith Green heeft meer over Spinoza op etsu.academia.edu/KeithGreen ]

• Jaime Francisco Pericás Sáez, Suicide and Self-sacrifice in Spinoza's Philosophy. MA-thesis Dep. of Philosophy Central European University, Boedapest, 2015  [PDF]

• Steven Nadler, “Spinoza on Lying and Suicide.” In: British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 24, 2016 - Issue 2, Pages 257-278 [PDF]

Abstract: Spinoza is often taken to claim that suicide is never a rational act, that a ‘free’ person acting by the guidance of reason will never terminate his/her own existence. Spinoza also defends the prima facie counterintuitive claim that the rational person will never act dishonestly. This second claim can, in fact, be justified when Spinoza's moral psychology and account of motivation are properly understood. Moreover, making sense of the free man's exception-less honesty in this way also helps to clarify how Spinoza should, and indeed does, recognize the possibility of rational suicide. [tandfonline]

• Steven Nadler, “On Spinoza's ‘Free Man’.” In: Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 1, 2015 [cf. & PDF]

abstract: In this paper, I examine Spinoza’s ‘model of human nature’ in the Ethics, and especially his notion of the ‘free man’. I argue that, contrary to usual interpretations, the free man is not an individual without passions and inadequate ideas but rather an individual who is able consistently to live according to the guidance of reason. Therefore, it is not an impossible and unattainable ideal or incoherent concept, as has often been claimed, but a very realizable goal for the achievement of human well-being.

Ook al komt ‘suicide’ in dit artikel niet voor; ik neem het hier op daar het wel over ‘de menselijke natuur’ gaat – relevant in dit verband. En omdat Nadler er in het vorige artikel meermalen naar verwijst.

• Steven Nadler, “A free man thinks least of all of death”, Chapter 12 of Spinoza. A Life, 1999 [cf. ‘t PDF van de eerste editie van 1999 – daarin de laatste dagen vanaf p. 349 & ook nog eens ‘t PDF van de tweede editie van 2018 – daarin de laatste dagen vanaf p. 406; in een noot op p. 407 is de publicatie van Nanne Bloksma verwerkt].

Het leek me wel nuttig het laatste hoofdstuk in Nadler’s Spinoza. A Life dat gaat over de laatste jaren en dagen van Spinoza, samen met zijn opvattingen over de dood, dat meerdere malen naar internet werd gebracht, hier in deze reeks op te nemen.

• John Grey, “Reply to Nadler: Spinoza and the metaphysics of suicide.” In: British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2016 [PDF cf. ook academia.edu]   

Abstract: In this paper I'm going to argue that both, Spinoza and Kant, construct the argument "for the impossibility of self-destruction" and examine how the concept of suicide relates to the concept of humanity in both philosophers.

 Steven Nadler has argued that Spinoza can, should, and does allow for the possibility of suicide committed as a free and rational action. Given that the conatus is a striving for perfection, Nadler argues, there are cases in which reason guides a person to end her life based on the principle of preferring the lesser evil. If so, Spinoza’s disparaging statements about suicide are intended to apply only to some cases, whereas in others (such as the case of Seneca) he would grant that suicide is dictated by reason. Here, I object to Nadler’s interpretation by showing that it conflicts with Spinoza’s metaphysical psychology. Even given Nadler’s interpretation of the conatus doctrine, the possibility that reason could guide a person to commit suicide is incompatible with the conatus of the mind. Spinoza holds that the mind cannot contain an adequate idea ‘that excludes the existence of our body’ (E3p10). Yet, as I argue, in order for reason to guide a person voluntarily to end her life, she would need to have an adequate idea representing her death – an idea that excludes the existence of her body. For this reason, Spinoza’s system rules out the possibility of rational suicide.

Zie ook hoe John Grey Spinoza’s benadering van zelfmoord behandelt in het door hem geschreven lemma “Benedict De Spinoza: Moral Philosophy” in de Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. In het blog van 01-06-2015 liet ik zien hoe Grey een enigszins deontologisch moralistische benadering heeft.

Bovenstaand artikel van Steven Nadler, “Spinoza on Lying and Suicide,” beschouw ik als het boeiendste en uitdagendste artikel in de hele reeks. Ik heb echter moeite om het met Nadler eens te kunnen zijn dat volgens Spinoza zelfdoding een rationale keuze kan zijn, een vrije en rationele actie, n.l. wanneer het behouden van de bereikte perfectie, belangrijker kan worden gevonden dan het behouden van het tijdelijke bestaan. Het is me nog niet gelukt om te ontdekken, waar hij de 'fout' in gaat, maar ik heb gevoelsmatig de indruk dat hij Spinoza wil meenemen  in een betoog dat het zijne niet is. Ik ga het zeker nog eens herlezen en nader bestuderen.
Daar Nadler verwijst naar een artikel van Michael Lebuffe dat met zijn visie in overeenstemming zou zijn, neem ik - hoewel het slechts zijdelings iets over zelfdoding zegt - ook hier op in de lijst (vooral daar het PDF ervan te vinden bleek):

• Michael LeBuffe, "Spinoza’s Summum Bonum." In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 86 [2005], pp. 243 - 266 [PDF]

Abstract: As Spinoza presents it, the knowledge of God is knowledge, primarily, of oneself and, secondarily, of other things. Without this knowledge, a mind may not consciously desire to persevere in being. That is why Spinoza claims that the knowledge of God is the most useful thingto the mind at IVP28. He claims that the knowledge of God is the highest good, however, not because it is instrumental to perseverance, but because it is also the best among those goods that we seek for their own  sakes. It is acquiescentia in se ipso, the highest form of laetitia.

• Chris M Davidson, “Sovereign Suicide: Spinoza's Sovereign Has No Conatus.”   [academia.edu]

Abstract: Is the sovereign of Spinoza an “individual,” in the sense detailed in his Ethics? Every true individual has a conatus, by which it strives to maintain its existence. Sovereignty is often assumed to strive to preserve itself, but this must be denied, since it can destroy itself through its own activity. Sovereignty’s risk of destruction comes not from outside, as is the case for any true individual, but arises internally: sovereignty commits suicide. Hence, sovereignty is not a true individual, but merely a collision of disparate forces, which has a number of political and practical implications.

Niet gedateerd; waarschijnlijk paper gepresenteerd tijdens de workshop die op 18 maart 2016 in Leuven werd gehouden over: “The Body in Spinoza’s Philosophy.” De bijdrage van Christopher Davidson (University of Arkansas at Little Rock) droeg de titel: “Political Suicide: The Body of Spinoza’s Sovereign Has No Self-Preserving Conatus,” [cf.]

• Ulysses Pinheiro, “Acrasia, metamorfoses e o suicídio de Sêneca na Ética de Espinosa.” In: ANALYTICA, Rio de Janeiro, vol 12 nº 2, 2008, p. 199-244 [PDF]

• Juan-Vicente Cortés-Cuadra, “Le suicide de Sénèque chez Spinoza. Entre paradoxe éthique et question politique.” In: Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 2017/3 (Volume 101), Pages 405 – 442; ook in Érudit / Revues / Laval théologique et philosophique, Volume 74, Numéro 1, Février, 2018, p. 5–21 [Cf.]

Abstract: This article focuses on the example of Seneca’s suicide, which Spinoza uses in order to explain what sort of causality is involved in suicide (E IV P 20 S). According to Spinoza, suicide is always determined by an external cause and the person who kills herself is therefore a “weakminded”; she has been “completely conquered” by an external force contrary to her nature (E IV P 18 S). Nevertheless, the case of Seneca puts this generalization into question because the wise stoic appears to behave rationally and, moreover, is situated within political relationship of obedience from which he cannot escape. Thus, he seems to be representing the polar opposite of a weak person. Finally, we will attempt to conceptualize what a properly spinozistic position concerning suicide is and how it may face some of the issues pertaining to the problem of suicide.

• Daniele D’Amico, “L’idea della morte nella filosofia di Spinoza. Laboratorio dell’ISPF, Vol. XIV, 2017 [PDF]

ABSTRACT: The idea of death in Spinoza’s philosophy. This paper focuses on two aspects of Spinoza’s account of death. On the one hand, it analyses the idea of death which can be object of scientific investigation. On the other hand, it considers the idea of death psychologically linked to our fear of death. Spinoza’s reductionist perspective over all natural phenomena includes death itself. Death is in fact a natural phenomenon which, in its real effects on our affective life, can be object of rational enquiry. However, the fear of one’s own death remains a constant challenge for any rational man. No positive meditation on death is possible. A free man is not free because he does not fear death; on the contrary, he does not fear death because he is free, that is to say that his mind thinks of something else.