Spinozisme over leven, dood en zelfdoding bij #Spinoza [4]

Dan vermeld ik in dit blog [de eerste helft van] de teksten in de secundaire Spinozaliteratuur over dood en zelfdoding bij Spinoza; waar mogelijk met de vindplaatsen van PDF’s ervan en zoveel mogelijk in chronologische volgorde [de andere helft in volgend blog]

• Wallace Matson, “Death and Destruction in Spinoza’s Ethics”. In: Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 20, 1977, no.403 [cf. bij Centre for suicide prevention - & PDF]
Reprint in Genevieve Lloyd (ed.), Spinoza: Critical Assessments. London: Routledge, 2002; Vol. II, in Part VII. Issues of Life and Death, Chapter 34.

Abstract: An exposition of Spinoza's views of the cause and cure of death. He holds death to be disruption of mind/body which need not involve becoming a corpse; amnesia counts. It follows that his criterion of personal identity includes memory, so Spinozistic immortality is impersonal. The cause of death is always something external, for nothing can destroy itself. (This principle, however, is not universally true; Spinoza was led to it by mistaken physics.) Suicide is irrational. Fear of death is to be overcome by realization that since adequate ideas are eternal, to the extent that they consitute our minds we are eternal also. (But if so, isn't suicide rational after all? And since language depends on memory, the eternal understanding of adequate ideas is non-linguistic and non-symbolic; what then can it be?)

• Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1984 - § 56 Suicide, pp. 237 - 240  Die § haal ik hier naar binnen:

• Martin Hemelík, “MORS IMMORTALI (The problem of death in Spinoza's philosophy).” In: E-LOGOS. ELECTRONIC JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY [Cf. aldaar geen datumaanduiding; volgens de Duitse Spinoza Bibliografie, die vele titels van Hemelik geeft, is het een tekst uit 1994

ABSTRACT: Death and dying - these are very important philosophical problems. Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza who ranks among the rationalists of the  XVIIth century, solves the problem of death in the framework of his ontological schedule. The author summarizes the basic elements of Spinoza's solution: Death can play the role of evil only for such kind of people which is not able of higher forms of understanding, i.e. only for people who are called "homines carnales" by Spinoza; for people whom Spinoza called "homines sapientes", death cannot play this role. On the contrary, homo sapiens is able to overcome death because he understands himself and the necessity of things and God.

• Steven Barbone & Lee Rice, “Spinoza and the Problem of Suicide.” In: International Philosophical Quarterly 34 (2) [June 1994], 229-241 [pdc.net] Reprinted in Genevieve Lloyd (ed.), Spinoza: Critical Assessments. London: Routledge, 2002; Vol. II, in Part VII. Issues of Life and Death, Chapter 35, 262-278

Veel wordt naar dit artikel verwezen. Ik heb het jammer genoeg op internet nergens kunnen vinden. [Cf. PDF-cv Lee C. Rice]

• Mitchel Gabhart, “Spinoza on Self-Preservation and Self-Destruction.” In: Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 37, Number 4, October 1999 [Muse.jhu & PDF]

Zijn punt: “Spinoza cannot make meaningful a distinction between suicide and any other form of death.”

• Leszek Kolakowski, "Spinoza: A Metaphysics of Suicide or Revival?" in Leszek Kolakowski, The Two Eyes of Spinoza and other essays on Philosophers. Zbigniew Janukowski (Ed.). South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2003. - VII, 311 pp., 16-26

Dit hoofdstuk gaat niet over de 'gewone' zelfdoding, zoals de meeste andere artikelen behandelen. Kolakowski schrijft daarover slechts één zin: "Suicide is against nature, Spinoza expressly establishes." (p. 25). Hem gaat het erom hoe Spinoza geen individualisatiebeginsel heeft dat de transitie van het ene, onveranderlijke en eeuwige naar de vele, veranderlijks en tijdelijke dingen, maar hoe hij toch een relatie wil leggen tussen het via begrijpen éénworden met God, waarmee we het individuele kwijtraken (hij noemt dat 'spiritual suicide'), hetgeen niet te verzoenen is met de leer van de conatus, waarmee elk eindig ding wil trachten zijn voortbestaan te handhaven. Over die metafysische ambivalentie of zelfs tegenspraak heeft Kolakowski het.

• Justin Galindo, “Determinism, Freedom, and The Problem of Suicide: Scholarly Issues on Spinoza’s Thought,” in: despinoza.nl [16-12-2005 - zonder nadere aanduiding over waar het artikel gevonden was]

• Sanja Ivic [Institute for European Studies Belgrade Serbia], “Spinoza and Kant on Suicide”. In: Res Cogitans 2007 no. 4, vol. 1, 132-144 [cf. & PDF uploaded 16 March 2015.]

Abstract: In this paper I’m going to argue that both, Spinoza and Kant, construct the argument “for the impossibility of self-destruction” and examine how the concept of suicide relates to the concept of humanity in both philosophers. I will argue that Kant’s and Spinoza’s argument for the impossibility of self-destruction follows from the “external cause” premise and not from “the same subject” premise. I will try to show that Spinoza and Kant argue that suicide is irrational – it is never done rationally or freely.

• Ulysses Pinheiro, “Acrasia, metamorfoses e o suicídio de Sêneca na Ética de Espinosa.” In: ANALYTICA, Rio de Janeiro, vol 12 nº 2, 2008, p. 199-244 [PDF]

• Jason Waller, ‘Spinoza on the Incoherence of Self-Destruction’. In: British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (3):487 – 503 (2009) [tandfonline; cf. PDF]

Abstract: Spinoza claims at E3p4 that ‘no thing can be destroyed except through an external cause’1. This claim is essential to Spinoza’s metaphysics, psychology, ethics, and political philosophy. Despite its importance most scholars believe that the demonstration of this proposition makes two invalid inferences and that the claim itself is an ad hoc addition to Spinoza’s system. In this paper I defend Spinoza against these two objections. I argue that Spinoza’s prohibition on self-destruction follows directly from his views on the nature of causation and destruction. Once these views are understood, I argue that a valid interpretation of the demonstration of E3p4 suggests itself.

• Jon A. Miller, “Spinoza's Possibilities.” In: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 54, No. 4 (June 2001), pp. 779-814 [jstor]

• Jon Miller, “Stoics and Spinoza on suicide,” in: Gábor Boros (Hrsg.), Der Einfluss des Hellenismus auf die Philosophie der frühen Neuzeit. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz / Herzog August Bibliothek [Wolfenbütteler Forschungen, Band 108], 2005 - 198 Seiten – PDF-Inhaltsverzeichnis - & PDF-hfdst_Miller gegeven door Torin Doppelt via het curriculum van de cursus “Life, Death, and Meaning” aan de Queen's University in 2016 – cf.; Doppelt deed de Indexing and editing voor Jon Miller’s boek Spinoza and the Stoics; tevens was Miller advisor bij Doppelt’s dissertatie in 2018 [cf. CV]
[Uitvoerige bespreking van het boek in Sehepunkte.de]

• Jon [Arnold] Miller, Spinoza and the Stoics. Cambridge University Press, 2015 - 238 pagina's – books.google

• Jason E. Smith, A TASTE FOR LIFE. (ON SOME SUICIDES IN DELEUZE AND SPINOZA). In: PARRHESIA, NUMBER 10 • 2010 • 75-85 [PDF]

Gaat o.a. uitgebreid in op Spinoza’s Seneca-voorbeeld in 4/20s



Luca Giordano (1634-1705), The Death of Seneca, Burghley House

 

 

• Gordon Hull, “Of Suicide and Falling Stones: Finitude, Contingency, and Corporeal Vulnerability in (Judith Butler’s) Spinoza.” In: Hasana Sharp & Jason Smith (Eds.), Hegel after Spinoza: A Volume of Critical Essays. London: Bloomsbury/Continuum, 2012, 151-69. [cf.]

• Christopher Morrissey, “Spinoza & the Stoics on Suicide.” Blog published: Jul 1, 2016 - cf. theimaginativeconservative.org

• Eric Delassus, “Le suicide de Spinoza: un problème éthique et philosophique.” In: ¿ Interrogations ?, Revue pluridisciplinaire de sciences humaines et sociales N°15. Identité fictive et fictionnalisation de l’identité (I), décembre 2012, [cf. html & PDF]

Summary: According to some biographers, Spinoza might have ended his life with his doctor’s help. Therefore Spinoza’s death could be interpreted as assisted suicide. Such a hypothesis cannot but pose a problem in philosophical terms, in the case of a thinker who says that « a free man thinks of death least of all things ». Could suicide, under certain conditions, be regarded as a free man’s act, within the framework of Spinoza’s ethics ? Although it is possible to respond positively to such a question, it would, however, be excessive, to use Spinoza as an intellectual argument to support assisted suicide.

[voor de rest: zie volgend blog]