Daarover
had ik al eens een blog van 01-05-2011:
‘Acquiescentia in se ipso” - ik verwijs ook naar het blog van 17-09-2013: “Spinoza's samenvatting van zijn
Ethica”, waarin eveneens acquiescentia voorkomt.
Op
31 januari 2018 had ik het blog: “Clare Carlisle wint met »Spinoza's Acquiescentia« prijs Beste artikel in 2017 van The Journal of the
History of Philosophy.”
Op
zich had ik eigenlijk geen aanleiding om weer eens over dit in Spinoza’s leer belangrijke
begrip te schijven. Aanleiding dat ik hier een klein overzicht van specifieke
literatuur breng, is een recente upload naar Academia.edu van een artikel over
aquiescentia door een Will Cox, waarin tot mijn verbazing het gelauwerde
artikel van Clare Carlisle niet voorkomt. De link naar Cox’s artikel zal ik aan
het eind geven.
● Laurent Bove, "Hilaritas et acquiescentia in se
ipso, une Dynamique de ja Joie," Chapitre IV in: Laurent Bove, La
stratégie du conatus: affirmation et résistance chez Spinoza. Vrin, 1996 - books.google
● Laurent Bove, “Hilaritas and Acquiescentia in se
ipso.” In: Yirmiyahu Yovel and Gideon Segal (EDS.), Spinoza on Reason and the "Free Man": Spinoza by 2000 -
The Jerusalem Conferences, Ethica IV. New York: Little Room Press, 2004:
209-226.
● Giuseppina (= Pina) Totaro, “Acquiescentia dans la
cinquième partie de l’Ethique de Spinoza”. In: Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger 184 (1994):
65-79.
● Donald Rutherford, “Salvation as a State of Mind: The
Place of Acquiescentia in Spinoza’s Ethics”. In: British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (1999): 447-473. [PDF
bij BookSC]
● Donald P. Rutherford schreef vervolgens het lemma “Acquiescentia
in se ipso” in de Continuum Companion to
Spinoza (2011) – later The Bloomsbury
Companion to Spinoza. Onderaan haal ik het betreffende ‘lemma’ naar binnen.
● Clare Carlisle, "Spinoza's Acquiescentia"
in: The Journal of the History of
Philosophy 55.2 (April 2017): 209-36.
cf. PDF
Abstract: This article examines the affect of acquiescentia in
Spinoza’s Ethics, presenting an original interpretation of acquiescentia
which illuminates the account of blessedness developed in Part V of the Ethics.
It also shows how Spinoza’s complex but coherent account of acquiescentia has
been obscured by inconsistent translations of acquiescentia, and forms
of the verb acquiescere, in the standard English edition of the Ethics.
Spinoza’s discussion of acquiescentia both draws on and critiques the
equivalent Cartesian passion, la satisfaction de soi-même, which is
translated as ‘acquiescentia in se ipso’ in the Latin edition of the Passions
of the Soul. For Spinoza, acquiescentia is an inherently cognitive
affect, since it involves an idea of oneself (as the cause of one’s joy). As
such, the affect is closely correlated to the three kinds of cognition
identified by Spinoza in Ethics II. Just as there are three kinds of
cognition, so there are three kinds of acquiescentia – a point that has
hitherto been missed by commentators. Two qualities – stillness and obedience –
provide the criteria for distinguishing true or genuine acquiescentia from
its false, “empty” counterpart, corresponding to imaginatio. According
to Spinoza, Descartes’s conception of acquiescentia belongs entirely to
this inadequate, confused kind of cognition. The qualities of stillness and
obedience also distinguish between two kinds of true acquiescentia,
corresponding to ratio and scientia intuitiva.
● Will Cox, “Acquiescentia, Gloria, and the Cause of
the Idea of the Self in Spinoza’s Ethics” - cf. academia.edu
Abstract. Spinoza consistently associates
the affect of acquiescentia with that of gloria throughout the Ethics, but he only
poses it as equivalent to the latter in two passages. The first concludes with
the verdict that the affect in question is "nothing" (E4p58s), while
the second commences with the affirmation that it is "our salvation"
(E5p36s). How can two so manifestly contrary characterizations nevertheless
apply to one and the same affect? The restricted scope of this question belies
the depth of its stakes: nothing less than the nature of, and relationship
between, opinion and wisdom, merely living and living well, such as they take
form within Spinoza's thought.
I argue that the definition of
acquiescentia remains constant over the course of the Ethics, even while the
cause of one of its parts progressively changes. Each form of acquiescentia is
a joy accompanied by the idea of oneself as the cause of that joy. But this
idea itself can arise in different ways, depending on which of Spinoza’s three
kinds of knowledge produces it. In imaginative acquiescentia, I know myself as
the cause of my joy because of the praise that another renders me. In rational
acquiescentia, I know myself as the cause of my joy because of a common notion
that I possess concerning the relationship of things to their affections. In
intuitive acquiescentia, I know myself as the cause of my joy simply because I
know myself.
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