#Spinoza vaak vergeleken met het Boeddhisme en Hindoeïsme

Al vaker heb ik hierover blogs gehad [zie onder de links erheen]. Onlangs kwam ik enige recente teksten tegen die ik hieraan graag toevoeg.

 Deel cover OHM INFOMAGAZINE, 18e jg., april-juni 2012 [issuu]

 ● Kenneth Dorter, THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION IN SPINOZA AND SHANKARA. Symposium, vol. 18 no. 1 (Spring/Printemps 2014), pp. 216-235 - PDF

Abstract: Philosophers from traditions that are not only entirely different but apparently uninfluenced by each other sometimes show remarkable similarities. In the case of Spinoza and Shankara such similarities include the dual-aspect model according to which the apparent pluralism of the world rests on an inadequate perception of its one-ness, and the way the overcoming of that inadequacy is conceived as a liberation from the passions and an achievement of immortali-ty. A significant difference between the two, however, is that Spino-za's explanations are epistemologically conceived while Shankara's are conceived ontologically. Not that Spinoza lacked an ontology or Shankara an epistemology, but rather their explanatory approach-es emphasize the differences of the worlds within which they wrote.

● Noah Forslund, “Spinoza the Hindu: Advaita Interpretations of The Ethics.” In: Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College, Issue V - Spring 2018 - PDF. Ik breng hier de eerste alinea

Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza holds a distinctive, if enigmatic, place in

the Western philosophical canon. Although usually considered as a Cartesian

rationalist, Spinoza’s metaphysical and epistemological views continue to be

considered somewhat anomalous within the Occidental tradition.1 Arguably, in fact,

much of his influential Ethics espouses a substantively non-“Western” philosophical

doctrine beneath orthodox rationalist terminology and organization. I contend

that, although it employs decidedly Western-rationalist methods of inquiry, The

Ethics actually proposes a system strikingly similar to the ontological-philosophical

worldview found in Advaita Vedanta Hinduism. Core similarities between the schools

include their (1) non-dualist, monistic metaphysical systems, (2) a strong relationship

between humans and the divine, and (3) a potential for living liberation. This paper

will consist of comparative analyses of metaphysical and epistemological facets of

both the Advaita and Spinozistic philosophical traditions, including overviews of

both schools, and concluding with a suggestion that these similarities might prompt

a reexamination and critique of the oft-cited East-West dichotomy.

● Gordon F. Davis & Mary D. Renaud, "Spinoza Through the Prism of Later ‘East-West’ Exchanges: Analogues of Buddhist Themes in the Ethics and the Works of Early Spinozists." Chapter 5 in Gordon F. Davis (Ed.), Ethics without Self, Dharma without Atman: Western and Buddhist Philosophical Traditions in Dialogue. Springer, 2018, p. 107 – 130 – books.google- cf. PDF bij bookSC. De eerste twee alinea’s:  

In the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century, one sees the first significant contact between European philosophers and the world of Buddhist and other Asian philosophical traditions. As we shall see, however, this contact was limited in many ways, especially during the lifetime of Baruch Spinoza (1632–77), our main focus in this chapter. Our chapter falls into the ‘pre-contact’ part of this volume, because for almost all the figures we discuss here, the primary sources of Asian philosophy – and especially Buddhism – remained largely unavailable. The sort of direct inspiration for which Schopenhauer is famous was still a long way off, whether we are speaking of Spinoza’s own time and place, or of those, almost a century later, who began to see the putatively ‘Asiatic’ resonance of his philosophy as a positive rather than a negative feature. Our aim here is not merely historical, though. Besides noting such episodes as the ‘Chinese Rites Controversy’ in Spinoza’s time, we will approach Spinoza on his own terms, before asking how his ideas compare to those of Buddhist ethics. And in addition to considering Chinese forms of Buddhism, we consider the Indo-Tibetan ones (and some Hindu themes) that came to be familiar only in the late eighteenth century – the time when Spinozist ideas were taken more seriously than ever before, albeit newly inflected with currents of thought deriving partly from Asian sources.

Some Spinoza scholars might still be intrigued by the suggestion Lewis Maverick made many years ago, to the effect that Spinoza himself may have been influenced by early reports of Chinese philosophical ideas, those relayed by Jesuits in the early 1600s.1 Other Spinoza scholars might dismiss such speculation, and refrain from direct comparisons, and might instead scrutinize the motivations and biases of writers who have explored such comparisons, bolstering a scepticism about the various books that have trumpeted a convergence of Spinozist and Buddhist thought, ranging from Melamed’s Spinoza and Buddha (1933) to kindred explorations by Jon Wetlesen (1979) and Arne Naess (2008).2 We will not be pursuing either of those historical investigations here. Rather, our concern is to reconsider the question that these writers were asking in the first place, the question of how much of Spinoza’s thought was prefigured in Buddhist doctrine. To that extent, we ourselves risk getting entangled in something akin to an ‘Orientalizing’ tendency, which is one way to describe the early modern interest in Asian philosophy, with its widespread use of the term ‘oriental’ in European languages, and its risk of imposing additional distorting lenses where an initial hermeneutic prism is already ipso facto present.3 Be that as it may, another of our aims, occupying the second half of the chapter, is to chart the development of a Spinozist ethic that inspired a few French and German writers who were also open to the insights of Asian philosophical traditions. In light of this, we consider, finally, the impact of this ethic on the social and political context of both rationalist and romantic phases of the European Enlightenment.

 ● Blog van Seth Zuiho Segall van 26 juli 2015: Dogen, Spinoza, and Whitehead

 Eerdere blogs

01-10-2008: Boeddhisme, hindoeïsme en interesse in Spinoza

05-06-2009: Hebben de oosterse en de westerse verlichtingstradities iets met elkaar?

16-04-2010: Samuel Max Melamed (1885 - 1938) hield zich veel met Spinoza bezig [o.a. over zijn Spinoza and Buddha. Visions of a dead God. Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1933]

10-11-2010: Matteo Ricci (1552 - 1610), Philippo Mignini & Spinoza

08-01-2012: Bestudeerde Spinoza het werk van Confucius?

04-12-2013: Jammer dat het non-dualiteitsbegrip gekaapt is en niet meer voor Spinoza is te gebruiken

07-02-2014: Spinoza en de Boeddhanatuur naar Masao Abe's uitleg van Dogen Kigen (1200–1253)

07-05-2014: S. M. Melamed over "Spinoza and Buddha" (nogmaals) [met uitgebreide 1935-recensie W.G. van der Tak, van Melamed’s boek]

10-01-2015: Spinoza hoeft niet als 'Boeddha van de lage landen' gezien, maar parallellen lijken er wel te zijn 

06-04-2015: Was de naturalist en rationalist Spinoza tegelijk ook een mysticus? [5] de casus Wetlesen
[met daarin een link naar Jon Wetlezen's artikel “Body awareness as a gateway to eternity: a note on the mysticism of Spinoza  and its affinity to Buddhist meditation.”]

31-07-2015: Spinoza en het Boeddhisme over 'het Zelf'

28-09-2016: De filosofie van Spinoza vergeleken met het neo-confucianisme van Chu Hsi

12-06-2017: Spinoza veel vergeleken met Shankara

3 oktober 2017: Wat “sub specie infinitatis” zou kunnen betekenen – in Spinoza’s filosofie anders dan in die van iemand als de Japanse Kyotoschoolfilosoof Keiji Nishitani

4 december 2017: Can we avoid the dark night of Spinozism, a night in which all facts appear to be necessary? [met link naar encyclopedieën]

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Tot slot. In de bibliografie van alle hier genoemde hoofdstukken en artikelen staat het boek van S. M. Melamed, Spinoza and Buddha (1933). Dat leidt mij ertoe om - naast de recensie van W.G. van der Tak van Melamed’s boek uit 1935, cf. blog van 07-05-2014 - hier de korte, maar informatieve recensie te brengen van H. B. Robins in: The Journal of Religion, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Apr., 1934), pp. 249-250.

MELAMED, S. M. Spinoza and Buddha. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933. xi+391 pages. $3.00.

The author of this book has employed real learning in the interest of establishing a position which is at best precarious. Professing a supreme interest in the philosophy of history, he holds essentially that history is determined by great personalities, among the greatest of them being Buddha, Moses, Plato, St. Paul, and Spinoza. Two strains compete for the domination of the West, the one emanating from Hebraic sources, the other from Indian. Paradoxically enough, Spinoza, instead of being exponent of the Hebraic, epitomizes the Indian outlook-the world is explained away, man is a floating atom in the universe, only God remains, and God is dead. It was Christianity which won the Jew of Amsterdam away from his heritage; not Christianity as a continuation of Hebraism, but as its antithesis. Palestine in Jesus' day was overwhelmed by Buddhistic influences. The Baptist was a Mandaic religionist; Jesus was an Essene; Paul propagated a diluted Buddhism in the West under the name of Christianity. He was the first typically Eastern mystic in the Western world. St. Augustine was far more influenced by him than by Jesus. Through him this dead God who consumes a living world becomes basic to medieval mysticism. The pantheistic Eckhardt and Boehme paved way for Spinoza's subjective religiosity. The first and longest chapter, fluence on modern culture, is the most objective in the book. The remainder colored by the author's doctrinaire positions. Modern critical historians of do not support his contentions respecting the Essenes, John the Baptist, The bulk of sober opinion among historians of religion does not support Buddhistic invasion of the West prior to or simultaneous with the birth of movement. Dr. Melamed allows too little room for originality in the West, victim of the fallacy of post hoc propter hoc. It is too bad that the proof of not better read.--H. B. ROBINS.

In het bovenvermelde artikel van Kenneth Dorter, THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION IN SPINOZA AND SHANKARA. Symposium, vol. 18 no. 1 (Spring/Printemps 2014), geeft de auteur in note 4 een vergelijkbare of eigenlijk nog scherpere kritiek: