Ik kom op
dit blog via deze dia in Philip Turetzky’s Spinoza-course 17th-18th Century
Philosophy [cf. academia.edu]
“[A] virtual whole…is
understood to be a unique particular that is neither composed out of nor
divisible into proper parts. It is
neither the sum of its parts, nor is it something other than its
parts. It is itself a power (virtu)
expressing itself in different ways in different regions of itself. Its parts are, therefore, themselves powers
that are inseparable from the whole and are only distinguishable within
it by their capacities [what they can do]… a virtual whole is a unique power
whose parts are inseparable from it and are only distinguished according to
their capacities to act in a certain way… A virtual whole exists as acting;
that is, its activity is indivisible from its being (IP 34-5; IP 17c2).”
James Sikkema
“A Virtual Whole? Spinoza on the
Nature of Infinity and the Infinity of Nature”
Nature of Infinity and the Infinity of Nature”
Dit deed mij
verder zoeken naar deze James Sikkema. Een artikel met precies
bovenstaande titel vond ik niet, maar wel andere en vooral zijn dissertatie.
Over James
L. Sikkema
Sikkema promoveerde
op
James L.
Sikkema, Virtual Mereology: Power,
Affect, and Relation in Spinoza's 'Ethics'. PhD-thesis, McMaster
University, June 2015 -[cf. McMaster
University, aldaar PDF te downloaden]
LAY ABSTRACT: This thesis explores some basic
questions: 1) what is the essence of
existing things? 2) On what do such things, both causally and conceptually,
depend for their existence? 3) How are these things basically related? 4) How
can we come to know such things? The thesis enlists Baruch Spinoza's Ethics to help find answers to these
questions. In doing so it forges a novel interpretation of Spinoza's mature
philosophy by answering the questions thus: 1) The essence of any existing
thing is the power to both be and act. 2) Any finite thing that exists depends
for its existence on that which has the power to exist and act absolutely
infinitely. 3) This dependence relation is mereological in nature; i.e. things
are parts of the whole infinite power of existing 4) We know these things by
understanding our own particular power of activity.
Abstract: This dissertation offers a novel
interpretation of the metaphysical system Spinoza presents in his Ethics by
considering it entirely in terms of power, affectivity and part/whole
relations. I begin by arguing that the central concern of the Ethics is what I
term ‘the problem of passivity’. Namely, if as part of nature, we are
necessarily always subject to passive emotions, we could seemingly not become
active to the point of adequate conception without ceasing to be a part of
Nature. I argue that adequate conception, rather, requires a mereological
conception of oneself as part of the whole of Nature. Since such understanding
requires a conception of the whole in which these parts inhere, I explicate
Spinoza’s conception of substance as that which enjoys an absolute and infinite
power of existence. Inasmuch as this power of existence necessarily involves a
coextensive power to act, I then argue that for Spinoza the whole of Nature is
defined in terms of power. Consequently, the infinite modifications following
from eternal substance ought to be considered as powerful parts of this
potestative whole. Individual things are, then, to be defined as dispositional
structures manifesting their capacities in interdependent relations. The thesis
comes to explain this by using the Medieval mereological category of a ‘virtual
whole’ (i.e. a unique particular power whose parts are inseparable from it, and
only differentiated according to their own capacities). The dissertation
concludes with a suggestion for further research on the possibilities that the
presented theory of virtual mereology could have in relation to Spinoza’s
ethico-political philosophy.
Sikkema
baseert zich sterk, zoals in de voetnoten te zien is, op Deleuze.
In zijn
academia-pagina geeft hij meerdere concepten van artikelen. Ik haal er één naar
voren:
James
Sikkema, "Virtual Mereology: Power, Complexity and Individuation in Spinoza's
Ethics." [PDF acadeia.edu]
Abstract: This article presents a novel,
albeit speculative, interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics by viewing it
through the lens of the Medieval mereological category of a virtual whole and
its parts. A virtual whole is a unique, particular power that is neither composed
out of nor actually divisible into proper parts, and whose parts are only
distinguished by their power of activity. By importing this concept into
Spinoza's metaphysics I argue that there are real definitions of part and whole
if substance is understood as an absolutely infinite virtual or potestative
whole and if modes are, correspondingly, understood as powerful parts inhering
in this whole. The essay then enlists this virtual mereological theory to
account for the process of individuation.
Zoals boven
gezegd, ik heb niet kunnen vinden:
James
Sikkema, "A Virtual Whole? Spinoza on the Nature of Infinity an the
Infinity of Nature”
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