Gisteren verscheen van Galen Barry #Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation

Gisteren verscheen in een nieuw "Open Access"-tijdschrift, met veel Spinozadeskundigen in de redactieraad, zoals: Lilli Alanen, Dan Garber, Don Garrett, Susan James en Steven Nadler, het volgende artikel van
Galen Barry, "Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation." In:  Journal of modern Philosophy, Vol 1 [2019], #1, pp. 16 [PDF]
Abstract: This paper examines Spinoza’s view on the consistency of mental representation. First, I argue that he departs from Scholastic tradition by arguing that all mental states—whether desires, intentions, beliefs, perceptions, entertainings, etc.—must be logically consistent. Second, I argue that his endorsement of this view is motivated by key Spinozistic doctrines, most importantly the doctrine that all acts of thought represent what could follow from God’s nature. Finally, I argue that Spinoza’s view that all mental representation is consistent pushes him to a linguistic account of contradiction.