Michael LeBuffe bracht
het door hem voor International Encyclopedia of Ethics (2013) geschreven lemma naar academia.edu.
Om het op te kunnen nemen in de verzameling
lemma’s over Spinoza, neem ik het hier graag over in dit blog.
Spinoza, Baruch
Michael LeBuffe
Baruch, or
Benedictus, Spinoza (1632–77) is the author of works, especially the
Ethics
and the Theological-Political Treatise,
that are a major source of the ideas of
the
European Enlightenment. The Ethics is a dense series of arguments on
progressively
narrower
subjects – metaphysics, mind, the human affects, human bondage to passion,
and human
blessedness – presented in a geometrical order modeled on that of
Euclid. In
it, Spinoza begins by defending a metaphysics on which God is the only
substance
and is bound by the laws of his own nature. Spinoza then builds a naturalistic
ethics
that is constrained by, and to some extent is a product of, his strong
metaphysics.
Human beings are individuals that causally interact with other individuals
and are
extremely vulnerable to external influence. They are not substances.
Moreover,
human beings are bound by the same laws that bind all other individuals
in nature,
so Spinoza presents accounts of goodness, virtue, and perfection that are
consistent
with these perfectly general laws. Spinoza’s principal influences include
René
Descartes, Thomas Hobbes (see hobbes, thomas), Moses Maimonides (see
maimonides,
moses), the Roman Stoics (see stoicism), and Aristotle (see aristotle).
Although
his innovative philosophical views undoubtedly contributed to the
strong
writ of cherem, or ostracism, that Spinoza received from the Portuguese
Jewish
community
of Amsterdam in 1656, his work nevertheless also shows the influence
of the
study of Scripture and of Jewish law.
Metaphysics as a Constraint on Ethics
In his
metaphysics, Spinoza defines a substance as a thing that is in itself (or,
roughly,
that is
wholly causally independent) and that can be understood without understanding
anything
else (E1d3). Only God, Spinoza argues, fits this description:
“Except
God, no substance can be or be conceived” (E1p14). All other things, then,
Spinoza
calls modes of substance, entities that cannot exist apart from other things
or be
understood without an understanding of other things (E1d5). Spinoza makes
thought and
extension attributes of substance, or “what the intellect perceives of
substance,
as constituting its essence” (E1d4). Just as the one substance, God, may be
understood
to be essentially either thought or extension, so Spinoza argues any one
mode of
extension is identical with a mode of thought (E2p7s). A human being, for
example,
is well understood as a body or a mind.
Spinoza
defends both determinism, the view that prior conditions in uniform
ways
determine every change in the world (E1p28), and necessitarianism, the view
that
things could not be other than the way they are. His metaphysics is thus
different
from that
of his successor, Leibniz, who rejects necessitarianism and famously
[2]
argues
that God has chosen the best of all possible worlds. For Spinoza, “Things
could have
been produced by God in no other way and in no other order than they
have been
produced” (E1p33).
Spinoza
takes his claim that God is bound by necessity to have the further important
negative
implication that God does not act with a purpose: “To show now that nature
has no end
set for it and that all final causes are nothing but human fictions will not
be much
work. Indeed I believe that this is already well-established … from all of
those
propositions by which I have shown that all things proceed by eternal necessity
and with
the highest perfection” (E1, Appendix). God’s causal power is to be
understood
rather in terms of uniform natural laws and the causal power of each
individual
mode to bring about effects in accordance with those laws (E1p34, E3p6).
These
strong metaphysical views constrain Spinoza’s ethics dramatically.
Three
constraints are especially noteworthy. First, Spinoza’s conception of God rules
out any
view on which there exists a providential God who is distinct from the world
and
creates the world for human beings. Second, his determinism implies that no
actions,
including human actions (E2p48), are free in the sense of being without an
efficient
cause. Finally, Spinoza’s commitment to the view that all changes whatever
are to be
understood in terms of uniform natural laws commits him to naturalism
(see naturalism,
ethical). Spinoza expresses his naturalism bluntly in the Preface
to Part 3
of the Ethics, declaring that man is not “a kingdom within a kingdom”
and that
his geometrical method will therefore apply to human beings in the same
way that
it applies to all other things in nature: “I will consider human actions and
appetites
just as if it were an investigation of lines, planes, and bodies.”
Bondage to Passion
On
Spinoza’s ethical theory, whatever impedes human beings in their striving to
persevere
in being is evil, whether it is something outside the body that prevents a
person
from being able to do what he wants, ignorance of the means to perseverance,
or a
passion of the mind that causes a person to want something other than
perseverance
and its means. Whatever helps striving, on the other hand, is good.
This
section will provide an account of the impediments and aids to striving.
Spinoza
defines imagination at E2p17s: “The affections of the human body, the
ideas of
which represent external bodies as present to us, we shall call the images of
things,
even if they do not reproduce the figures of things. And when the Mind
regards
bodies in this way, we shall say that it imagines.” Ideas of imagination thus
include
all of our ideas of things that are partially caused by external objects,
including
sensory ideas, memories, and ideas produced by the experience of written
or spoken
language (E2p40s2). They also include passions (E3, General Definition
of the
Affects, E4p1s).
At E2p41,
Spinoza argues that ideas of imagination are the only cause of falsity. This
point
hints at a tendency in Spinoza to associate cognitive error, such as the error
that
I commit
in moving from the sensation of the sun in a pool of water to the conclusion
that the
sun is in the water, with practical or moral error, such as the error I commit
in
[3]
moving
from the pleasure I take in eating a bite of cake to the action of eating the
whole
cake. Just as passions are similar in kind to sensations, so practical error
that
arises
from passion is similar in kind to cognitive error that arises from sensation.
The
similarity in kind of sensation and passion is a powerful tool in Spinoza’s
ethics
because it
allows him apply Cartesian resources for the avoidance of cognitive error to
the case
of the passions. Descartes held that we can avoid the cognitive error that
typically
arises
from sensation by arriving at a better understanding of what sensation tells
us about
the external world. For example, I will not judge external objects to have
color
once I
understand that color is best understood as a feature of my ideas rather than
as
a feature
of things (Principles of Philosophy I.68). Alterna tively, we may have a
sensory
idea that
gives us a tendency to make a false judgment about some external object, but
we may be
guided by a different, better idea of the same object, and so avoid error. In
Meditation
III, for example, the meditator avoids error by following an astronomical
idea of
the sun rather than a sensory idea in judging the sun’s size. Spinoza applies
versions
of both
techniques in his discussion of remedies for the passions (5p3, 4p7), and
the few
explicit unqualified prescriptions in the Ethics recommend that we use them.
At E5p4s,
he recommends a better understanding of our passions:
We should
work especially hard in order to know each affect clearly and distinctly,
insofar as
it can be done, so that thereby the mind may be determined from an affect
to
thinking those things that it perceives clearly and distinctly and in which it
may be
completely
content; and also so that the affect may be separated from the thought of an
external
cause and joined to true thoughts.
At E5p10s,
Spinoza recommends that we resist harmful passions by cultivating
better,
opposed passions:
We should
think and meditate often about common human wrongs and how and in
what way
they may best be driven away by nobility … We should recount in detail and
frequently
imagine the common dangers of life, and how, by presence of mind and by
strength
of character, they may best be avoided and overcome.
In
addition to being ideas of imagination, passions are also changes in an
individual’s
essence, its striving to persevere in being. Spinoza introduces his theory
of
striving at the beginning of Part 3 of the Ethics. He argues at E3p6 that all
individual
things
strive to persevere in being. This claim serves his naturalism by bringing what
appears to
be a psychological doctrine on which anything, if it is not impeded, will
act to
persevere, close to a physical thesis, the principle of inertia, on which any body
in motion,
if it is not impeded, will continue in that motion. Indeed Spinoza’s term
for
“striving,” conatus, is a technical term of physics for Descartes, referring to
that
component
of a thing’s motion that belongs properly to the thing ( Principles of
Philosophy
III.57).
Spinoza
begins to build an account of what striving is for the human mind at E3p9:
“The mind,
both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and also insofar as it has
[4]
confused
ideas, strives to persevere in being; it does so for an indefinite duration;
and
it is
conscious of this, its striving.” Two features of this crucial proposition
deserve
emphasis.
First, Spinoza maintains that we strive insofar as we have confused ideas.
Second, we
are, in some way, conscious of our striving. The second feature is the basis
for
Spinoza’s account of desire, which he identifies with striving and, especially,
the
consciousness
of striving (E3p9s). On its basis, on might interpret E3p9 as a very
straightforward
and obviously false theory of human desire: I strive to persevere; I
desire
just as I strive; therefore I desire to persevere. The first feature
complicates the
interpretation
of E3p9; it also shows that Spinoza has a more plausible account of
conation.
As we have seen, Spinoza takes ideas of imagination to be the only source
of
falsity. We have also seen that they are incomplete, perhaps inaccurate,
representations
of their
objects. Certainly insofar as we strive to persevere from clear and distinct
ideas we
will consciously desire perseverance. Because we also strive insofar as
we have
confused ideas, however, it is not clear that our consciousness of striving
always
reproduces in our conscious experience the object of striving. Although
Spinoza
holds that I do strive to persevere insofar as I have confused ideas, he does
not hold
that I consciously desire perseverance insofar as I have such ideas. Indeed,
those who
are most in the sway of passion may desire other ends exclusively:
When the
greedy man thinks of no other thing besides profit or money, and the
ambitious
man of glory, and so on, they are not believed to be mad, because they are
often
troublesome and are estimated to deserve hatred. But really greed, ambition,
lust and
so on are species of madness, even though they are not counted among the
diseases.
(E4p44s)
So all our
conscious desires are, in some way, manifestations in consciousness of a
striving
to persevere in being, but those that are ideas of imagination are not
necessarily,
or even ordinarily, conscious desires for perseverance (see egoism).
Human
affects include passions, which are confused ideas, and also active emotions
such as
those that Spinoza mentions at E5p10s, nobility and tenacity, which are not
confused
and cannot lead us to error. At E3p11 and its scholium, Spinoza describes
the
affects in terms of changes in the power with which a person strives, and he
uses
terms that
suggest what the conscious experience of such changes is like. An increase
in a
body’s power of acting, or in the power of acting of part of that body, is a
form of
laetitia (roughly,
happiness); a decrease, however, is a form of tristitia (roughly, sadness).
Because
Spinoza’s terms for changes in the power with which a person strives
at least appear
to describe familiar conscious states, these definitions suggest a sense
in which,
although I do not always consciously desire perseverance in being, my
desire may
nevertheless always manifest a striving to persevere: if I do always desire
ends in which
I anticipate laetitia, then I am always desiring to experience an increase
in the
power with which I strive even if I do not recognize the end in question as
such
a thing.
Thus the greedy man, for example, if he anticipates laetitia in profit, does
strive for
perseverance in being also, after a fashion. Spinoza does come close to
giving an
account of desire like this one at E3p28 (see hedonism).
[5]
Perseverance
and what increases our power to persevere are good on the account
of the Ethics,
and this brief account of Spinoza’s psychological theory shows that there
may be
several barriers to the good facing a human agent. First, I may be weak.
Because,
as a finite mode, my power is limited, I may, despite my well-founded desire
for
perseverance and its means, lack the power to attain them. Second, I may be
ignorant.
In that
case, despite my well-founded desire for perseverance, I may lack knowledge
of its
means. Finally, I may be overwhelmed by passion. In this case, I may, even
despite my
knowledge of what helps me to persevere, be influenced by an external
object to
desire some other end. Although, as we have seen, Spinoza argues that better
ideas may
overpower worse ideas and so help us to avoid error, he does not hold that
they
always do (E4p17). So passion may move me to seek some other end even as, at
the same
time, I also desire perseverance. (Spinoza’s admission of the possibility of
akrasia is
an important departure from Descartes; see weakness of will.) Although
the Ethics
does contain accounts of the means to perseverance (see especially Spinoza’s
discussion
of society at E4p35–7), the great bulk of its argument describes the passions
and the
ways in which we can resist their influence. Clearly, Spinoza regards the
influence
of passion as the first and greatest barrier to the attainment of value.
Good, Virtue, Perfection
We now
turn to Spinoza’s account of value. The Ethics includes formal definitions of
a variety
of terms associated with moral value:
E2d6: By
“reality” and “perfection” I understand the same thing.
E4d1: By
“good” I shall understand this, what we certainly know to be useful to us.
E4d8: By
“virtue” and “power” I understand the same thing, i.e. (by 3p7) virtue,
insofar as
it is related to man, is the essence or nature of man itself, insofar as
he has the
power of bringing about those things that can be understood through
the laws
of his nature alone.
These
definitions need to meet the constraints both of Spinoza’s metaphysics,
especially
his naturalism, and also of his psychology.
An account
of value poses a challenge for Spinoza’s thoroughgoing naturalism
because it
is not clear whether moral properties are like other properties or whether
there is a
sense in which moral evaluation can apply to all things in nature alike.
Spinoza
does clearly attempt to meet these challenges in his definitions by reducing
perfection
(see perfectionism) and virtue (see virtue) to properties that, on his
metaphysics,
any individual thing will have: reality and power. In his definition of
his most
important term for value at E4d1, Spinoza might appear to meet the
challenge
similarly well by reducing goodness to usefulness. That definition requires
further discussion,
however, because, as the discussion of usefulness in the Preface
to Part 4
indicates, E4d1 refers to a certain kind of teleology: “By ‘good’ therefore in
what
follows I shall understand this: what we certainly know to be a means by
[6]
which we
may move close and closer to the model of human nature that we set
before
us.” As we have seen, Spinoza rejects the view on which nature itself has
ends.
Unlike Spinoza’s definitions of “perfection” and “virtue,” then, this sense of
“good”
will not obviously apply across nature. On the other hand, a rejection of a
view on
which nature itself has ends does not imply that particular individuals in
nature may
not have ends.
A
discussion of the good in relation to Spinoza’s psychology can inform a
discussion
of E4d1.
In Part 3 Spinoza makes two related claims about the ordinary use of the term
“good,”
which associate it with something familiar across nature, a change in power.
E3p9s: It
is established from all this, then, that we strive for, will, want, or desire
nothing
because we judge it to be good; rather, we judge something to be good
because we
strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it.
E3p39s: By
“good” here I understand every kind of laetitia, and whatever leads to it,
and
especially this: what satisfies any kind of longing, whatever that may be …
Indeed we
have shown above (E3p9s) that we desire nothing because we judge it
to be
good, but on the contrary, we call “good” that thing we desire.
The fact
that people find good what they desire and what they associate with laetitia
is
unqualified: both the ordinary people described in the Appendix to Part 1
and the
enlightened philosophers who accept 4d1 will do so (see desire theories
of the
good). Indeed Spinoza’s association of the good with laetitia, an increase
in
striving, gives this association a basis in his account of human nature. The
ordinary
person,
however, understands by that term something that is made well by
God, and
this understanding is both false and harmful (E1 Appendix). Spinoza’s
formal
definition retains the familiar notion of the good as something that advances
an end. In
making that end a human rather than a divine creation, however, Spinoza
both
conforms to regularities of use and also avoids the enshrinement of a
false
doctrine.
See
also: aristotle; desire theories of the good;
egoism; hedonism;
hobbes,
thomas; maimonides, moses; naturalism, ethical; perfectionism;
stoicism;
virtue; weakness of will
REFERENCES
All
references to Spinoza’s Ethics abbreviate
Spinoza’s formal apparatus. For example, “E3p9s” stands
for Ethics, Part 3, Proposition 9, Scholium.
All
Descartes references are to the Principles of
Philosophy or the Meditations,
which are available in
a number of translations.
Descartes,
René 1971. Oeuvres de Descartes,
ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, 11 vols. Paris:
Librarie J. Vrin.
Spinoza,
Baruch 1972. Spinoza Opera,
ed. Carl Gebhardt. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.
[7]
FURTHER READINGS
Curley,
Edwin 1988. Behind the Geometrical Method.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Curley,
Edwin (ed. and trans.) 1994. A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics
and Other Works. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Della
Rocca, Michael 2008. Spinoza.
New York: Routledge.
Garrett,
Don (ed.) 1996. The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza.
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Israel,
Jonathan, and Michael Silverthorne (eds. and trans.) 2007. Spinoza:
Theological-Political
Treatise. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
James,
Susan 1997. Passion and Action: The Emotions in
Seventeenth-Century Philosophy. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Kisner,
Matthew 2011. Spinoza on Human Freedom: Reason, Autonomy,
and the Good Life. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Koistinen,
Olli (ed.) 2009. The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics.
Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
LeBuffe,
Michael 2010. From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human
Excellence. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Nadler,
Steven 2006. Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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