Nu
ik toch bezig was met doorgeven van op internet te vinden theses over Spinoza, breng ik ook
deze van Hannibal Jackson, momenteel Adjunct Professor at Temple College [cf. LinkedIn].
Ik vraag me af of met de term ‘super necessitarianisme’ niet een beetje wordt
overdreven en of ie wel nodig is: of namelijk de term ‘necessitarianisme’ op
zich al niet voldoende het verdergaande
dan ‘determinisme’ uitdrukt. Om dat te beoordelen zou ik de dissertatie moeten
lezen, waar ik momenteel nog niet aan toekom.
Hannibal
Jackson, Eternal and expansive super
necessitarianism: a new interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics. PhD-thesis
University of Iowa, 1 dec. 2016, - viii, 250 pages – cf. & PhilPapers
& PDF. Hierna het abstract:
Abstract:
A key issue concerning the views of Spinoza is
whether he is a necessitarian or if he allows for the existence of
possibilities. Commentators on Spinoza agree that his metaphysics revolve
around, at the very least, a deterministic universe in which the laws of
nature, together with all preceding causes, determine everything that occurs.
There is also agreement that Spinoza does allow for doxastic (or epistemic)
possibility, which involves humans being able to imagine different outcomes
based on inadequate knowledge of preceding causes. For instance, humans can
imagine a particular car existing or not existing. The divide among
commentators occurs over the issue of whether Spinoza is a necessitarian or
not. For instance, consider the existence of a black car. If Spinoza is a
necessitarian, then the car could not be any color other than black; otherwise,
the car could have been a different color. Due to Spinoza’s acceptance of a universe
based on deterministic laws, the entire causal order would have to be different
in order to produce the car in a different color. A major focus of this study,
therefore, will be on whether Spinoza allows that the entire causal order could
have been different.
Views
supporting a necessitarian interpretation of Spinoza, those of Garrett and Koistinen,
will be examined as well as views supporting a possibilist interpretation of Spinoza,
those of Curley and Walski, and Miller. The views of these five commentators will
be examined in an attempt to determine their plausibility in regard to
Spinoza’s writings as well as their plausibility in regard to the consistency
of their arguments. In order to simplify the task of examining the allowance of
possibilities other than doxastic in Spinoza’s metaphysics, this study will
focus on Miller’s view of nomological possibility. Nomological possibility
involves everything that is consistent with the laws of nature when the laws of
nature are considered separately from the actual causal order. In the course of
this study the shortcomings of the views defending standard necessitarianism
will be demonstrated; the problems of the views espousing the allowance of
nomological possibilities will also be demonstrated. A major shortcoming of the
necessitarian views involves the plausibility of including one particular
causal order within God’s essence, while a major shortcoming of the possibilist
views will be their inability to handle the parallelism doctrine that Spinoza
holds.
A
major aim of this study is to demonstrate that nomological possibility, when combined
with IP17 in the Ethics, yields a result in which all the things consistent
with the laws of nature end up actually existing. IP17 declares that “God
creates everything that He understands.” If God understands everything
consistent with the laws of nature, then He creates everything consistent with
the laws of nature. The hybrid view, which is termed “super necessitarianism,”
will be examined to sketch a way that it could fit into Spinoza’s metaphysics.
The view of super necessitarianism will be considered in three variations,
those of eternal, expansive, and concentrated. Eternal super necessitarianism involves
all the things consistent with the laws of nature being created over the vast
spans of time, while expansive super necessitarianism involves all the things
being created over the vast universe. Concentrated super necessitarianism
involves all the things being created within the same finite mode but expressed
through different attributes. The choice will be made as to which of the three
variations of super necessitarianism is most plausible, and finally it will be
shown how super necessitarianism avoids some of the problems inherent in the necessitarian
and possibilist views.
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