donderdag 22 augustus 2019

#Spinoza over Acquiescentia in se ipso


Daarover had ik al eens een blog van  01-05-2011: ‘Acquiescentia in se ipso” - ik verwijs ook naar het blog van 17-09-2013: “Spinoza's samenvatting van zijn Ethica”, waarin eveneens acquiescentia voorkomt.

Op 31 januari 2018 had ik het blog: “Clare Carlisle wint met »Spinoza's Acquiescentia« prijs Beste artikel in 2017 van The Journal of the History of Philosophy.”

Op zich had ik eigenlijk geen aanleiding om weer eens over dit in Spinoza’s leer belangrijke begrip te schijven. Aanleiding dat ik hier een klein overzicht van specifieke literatuur breng, is een recente upload naar Academia.edu van een artikel over aquiescentia door een Will Cox, waarin tot mijn verbazing het gelauwerde artikel van Clare Carlisle niet voorkomt. De link naar Cox’s artikel zal ik aan het eind geven.  
Afbeelding uit nog weer een blog over acquiescentia, nl. dat van
 27-04-2014: "Komen trots en zelfvoldoening voort uit interne of uit externe oorzaak?"

Laurent Bove, "Hilaritas et acquiescentia in se ipso, une Dynamique de ja Joie," Chapitre IV in: Laurent Bove, La stratégie du conatus: affirmation et résistance chez Spinoza. Vrin, 1996 - books.google

Laurent Bove, “Hilaritas and Acquiescentia in se ipso.” In: Yirmiyahu Yovel and Gideon Segal (EDS.), Spinoza on Reason and the "Free Man": Spinoza by 2000 - The Jerusalem Conferences, Ethica IV. New York: Little Room Press, 2004: 209-226.

Giuseppina (= Pina) Totaro, “Acquiescentia dans la cinquième partie de l’Ethique de Spinoza”. In: Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger 184 (1994): 65-79.

Donald Rutherford, “Salvation as a State of Mind: The Place of Acquiescentia in Spinoza’s Ethics”. In: British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (1999): 447-473. [PDF bij BookSC]

Donald P. Rutherford schreef vervolgens het lemma “Acquiescentia in se ipso” in de Continuum Companion to Spinoza (2011) – later The Bloomsbury Companion to Spinoza. Onderaan haal ik het betreffende ‘lemma’ naar binnen.

Clare Carlisle, "Spinoza's Acquiescentia" in: The Journal of the History of Philosophy  55.2 (April 2017): 209-36. cf. PDF

Abstract: This article examines the affect of acquiescentia in Spinoza’s Ethics, presenting an original interpretation of acquiescentia which illuminates the account of blessedness developed in Part V of the Ethics. It also shows how Spinoza’s complex but coherent account of acquiescentia has been obscured by inconsistent translations of acquiescentia, and forms of the verb acquiescere, in the standard English edition of the Ethics. Spinoza’s discussion of acquiescentia both draws on and critiques the equivalent Cartesian passion, la satisfaction de soi-même, which is translated as ‘acquiescentia in se ipso’ in the Latin edition of the Passions of the Soul. For Spinoza, acquiescentia is an inherently cognitive affect, since it involves an idea of oneself (as the cause of one’s joy). As such, the affect is closely correlated to the three kinds of cognition identified by Spinoza in Ethics II. Just as there are three kinds of cognition, so there are three kinds of acquiescentia – a point that has hitherto been missed by commentators. Two qualities – stillness and obedience – provide the criteria for distinguishing true or genuine acquiescentia from its false, “empty” counterpart, corresponding to imaginatio. According to Spinoza, Descartes’s conception of acquiescentia belongs entirely to this inadequate, confused kind of cognition. The qualities of stillness and obedience also distinguish between two kinds of true acquiescentia, corresponding to ratio and scientia intuitiva.

Will Cox, “Acquiescentia, Gloria, and the Cause of the Idea of the Self in Spinoza’s Ethics” - cf. academia.edu

Abstract. Spinoza consistently associates the affect of acquiescentia with that of gloria throughout the Ethics, but he only poses it as equivalent to the latter in two passages. The first concludes with the verdict that the affect in question is "nothing" (E4p58s), while the second commences with the affirmation that it is "our salvation" (E5p36s). How can two so manifestly contrary characterizations nevertheless apply to one and the same affect? The restricted scope of this question belies the depth of its stakes: nothing less than the nature of, and relationship between, opinion and wisdom, merely living and living well, such as they take form within Spinoza's thought.

I argue that the definition of acquiescentia remains constant over the course of the Ethics, even while the cause of one of its parts progressively changes. Each form of acquiescentia is a joy accompanied by the idea of oneself as the cause of that joy. But this idea itself can arise in different ways, depending on which of Spinoza’s three kinds of knowledge produces it. In imaginative acquiescentia, I know myself as the cause of my joy because of the praise that another renders me. In rational acquiescentia, I know myself as the cause of my joy because of a common notion that I possess concerning the relationship of things to their affections. In intuitive acquiescentia, I know myself as the cause of my joy simply because I know myself.

 Hier dan het lemma van Donald Rutherford:

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