Aanvulling Bibliografie Hegel & #Spinoza [16]

Het vorige blog met de Bibliografie Hegel & Spinoza [15] zit zo vol, dat ik er niets meer aan toegevoegd krijg. Niet dat ik de opzet had en de indruk heb dat ik een volledige bibliografie heb, maar ik denk dat ik weinig mis.

Zoals ik in het blog van 24 september 2019 schreef, was de aanleiding voor het aanleggen van deze verzameling, het feit dat in Bilthoven een cursus gaat over Hegel, waarbij het straks ook over zijn lezing van Spinoza zal gaan. Daar loop ik met mijn blogs op vooruit…

Naar aanleiding van een mail gisteren over waar zijn uitspraak te vinden was: “Das Wahre ist das Ganze,” ging ik op verder onderzoek uit, naar teksten over wat hij ermee bedoeld kon hebben. En daarbij stuitte ik op een recent hoofdstuk waar ik niet omheen kan en dat ik aan de lijst wil toevoegen. Maar zoals al gezegd, mijn vorige blog zat al zo vol, dat het vastliep, zodat ik besloot tot dit aanvullende blog, waaraan ik ook eventuele latere interessante vondsten kan toevoegen.

● Holger Gutschmidt, »Hegel gegen Spinoza … und gegen Hegel. Hegels späte Kritik an der Substanzphilosophie und sein eigener Übergang von der „Substanz“ zum „Subjekt“,« in: Jindrich Karásek, Lukàs Kollert & Tereza Matejckova (Hrsg.), Übergänge in der klassischen deutschen Philosophie [Series: Jena-Sophia: Studien und Editionen zum deutschen Idealismus und zur Frühromantik, Volume 18]. Wilhelm Fink, 2019 – PDF Inhalt – PDF Vorwort door Jindřich Karásek. Daarin is te lezen:

Der Beitrag von Holger Gutschmidt ist dem bereits angesprochenen Problem der dreiteiligen Gliederung des hegelschen Systems gewidmet. Es ist Gutschmidt zufolge festzustellen, dass diese Gliederung bei keinem der unmittelbaren Vorgänger Hegels ein Vorbild findet. Gutschmidts These lautet, dass man eine gewisse Vorwegnahme dieser Gliederung in Spinozas Theorie der Erkenntnis von „Mens“, „Corpus“ und „Deus“ sehen kann. In diesem Zusammenhang bietet sich Gutschmidt zufolge eine Reihe von Parallelen an, die in dem Beitrag untersucht werden. Das Ziel dieser Untersuchung besteht darin zu zeigen, dass diese Parallelen das Verständnis von Hegels System und seiner Organisation zu erhellen vermögen.

Hieronder de eerste twee bladzijden (die bij Brill te vinden zijn; Brill Deutschland heeft de uitgave voor uitgever Fink verzorgd).

● James Kreines, Hegel’s Metaphysics: Changing the Debate. In: Philosophy Compass 1:5 (2006), pp. 466-480. [cf. academia.edu]  Ik neem hier z’n eerste paragraaf [zonder noten] over, waarin de auteur twee interpretaties schetst van Hegels omgaan met Spinoza:

1. Two Recently Popular Approaches

The first general approach popular in recent work is the more traditional of the two; I will call it traditionalism, following Redding (2002). I think this general view is best introduced in terms of the idea that Hegel aims to revive and modify a form of pre-Kantian metaphysics—namely, Spinoza’s monism.

Traditionalists see Hegel as following Spinoza in holding that everything real must be “in” a single, all-encompassing substance. So Hegel’s “absolute” is akin to what Spinoza calls “substance” or “God.” Spinoza claims that “from God’s supreme power, or infinite nature … all things, have necessarily flowed” (Ethics IP17S1). And Hegel similarly holds that “the absolute” determines, grounds, or organizes everything real.

Like some of his contemporaries, however, Hegel advocates a distinctively idealist form of monism, in this sense: he aims to synthesize Spinoza’s account of substance with the emphasis on freedom in Kant and later idealists.¹ But at this point there is a divergence between interpretive subvarieties. The most straightforward and vivid story is that Hegel sees substance itself as a mind or spirit (“Geist”) or “subject” which is somehow freely self-creating. In Taylor’s version, the “the universe” is supposed to be “posited by Geist” or by an allencompassing “cosmic spirit” (1975, 87ff.). This idea certainly provides a natural way to understand Hegel’s claim that “substance is essentially subject” (PhG 3:28/14).

But a different way of understanding Hegel’s modification of Spinoza is probably more popular in recent work, although it is also more difficult to summarize clearly. The basic idea is that everything real is determined by a fundamental organizing principle of the whole, which interpreters often call a basic “structure.” This is supposed to be what Hegel himself refers to as “the idea.” It is not itself a mind; it is an organizing principle which governs both natural and mental phenomena. But this “structure” is best or most completely realized specifically in phenomena such as self-consciousness, subjectivity, and freedom. Rolf Horstmann and Frederick Beiser are two, of many, advocates of interpretations of this general sort.

There is also a recently popular nontraditional approach to this material. If there is a single classic work of recent nontraditionalist interpretation, it is Robert Pippin’s Hegel’s Idealism (1989); Robert Brandom and Terry Pinkard have long been working along broadly similar lines. The basic view is best introduced in terms of the idea that Hegel’s theoretical philosophy is a continuation or extension of Kant’s critical project, rather than a revival or modification of any form of pre-critical metaphysics. More specifically, Hegel’s project is similar to Kant's attempt to account for the conditions of the possibility of cognition of objects: Hegel focuses on “forms of thought” which are comparable to Kant’s “categories.”³ And Hegel, following Kant, is interested in the source of the legitimacy or normative authority of these forms of thought; for example, Hegel follows what Brandom describes as a Kantian “shift in attention from ontological questions … to deontological ones.”

But Hegel’s project is also shaped by skepticism among post-Kantian idealists about Kant’s sharp distinction between concept and intuition. Hegel consequently places great emphasis on the challenge of accounting for determinate cognition or thought about objects, without assuming that determinacy is provided by a given manifold of sensible intuition.5 This task is supposed to send Hegel in two main new directions. First, he defends a form of holism according to which the “forms of thought” depend for their determinate identity on their places within a larger whole or network. And, second, Hegel argues that the conditions of the possibility of determinate cognition of objects includes the participation by individuals in social life. So Taylor is right that “Geist” is fundamental in Hegel’s theoretical philosophy, but this term does not refer to a “cosmic spirit”; it refers to our own historically developing forms of social life.