#Spinoza & Spinozistic Life Form

Daar Ursula Renz & Barnaby Hutchins eerder  deze maand zouden spreken bij de Spinoza Circle of London over "Spinoza on Human Subjectivity and the Notion of God’s Intellect" [Cf. & cf.], ontdekte ik haar project "Spinozistic Life Form" aan het Institute of Philosophy / Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt - wat ik hier graag doorgeef.

De intrigerende introductie-tekst van hun inleiding aan de Spinoza Circle of London houd ik hier graag vast:
Spinoza’s Ethics is frequently interpreted, especially in recent scholarship, as maintaining that everything, including human subjects, is grounded in God or substance – that substance is the sole fundamental feature of reality. At the same time, the perspective of finite minds seems to play a non-trivial role in the constitution of reality. How can this (seeming) tension between these two positions be reconciled? In our paper, we argue for three claims: (1) both positions are necessary for Spinoza’s metaphysics, but neither is reducible to the other; (2) to account for both of them, given their mutual irreducibility, subjectivity itself must be comprehended as a function of finite beings; (3) the notion of infinite intellect plays a transcendental-philosophical role, and is not a metaphysical description of the nature of God. Through the elaboration of these three claims, we propose a new picture of Spinoza’s metaphysics, according to which human subjectivity is an integral, irreducible, and ineliminable – and thereby fundamental – feature of reality.

In de openingszin proef je nog de invloed van Hegel's kijk op Spinoza tot in onze tijd...
Extra intrigerend vind ik de derde claim: "the notion of infinite intellect plays a transcendental-philosophical role, and is not a metaphysical description of the nature of God.
Hopelijk wordt dit nog eens gepubliceerd.