W.R. Sorley, Moral values and the idea of God: The Gifford lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen in 1914 and 1915; editions 11918, 21921 – archive.org
In deze door hem gegeven Gifford lectures maakt hij, door veel in te gaan op Spinoza’s leer zoals hij die leest, duidelijk hoe zijn benadering van ethiek zich lijnrecht tegenover die van Spinoza bevindt. Om dit aan te tonen heb ik hier enige grotere citaten uit dit werk: bij elkaar de omvang van7 A-4tjes uit een werk van 527 bladzijden.
Ik haal, om te beginnen, een tekst naar voren waarin hij én schetst dat volgens hem Spinoza een idealist is, denkend vanuit het geheel – het oneindige -, maar hoe dat van hemzelf (gelijkend op dat van Berkeley) uitgaat van de eindige dingen en dus lijnrecht t.o. de benadering van Spinoza staat.
THE TWO IDEALISMS
The view of life which recognises the importance of the moral values, and the experience which acknowledges them and relies on their persistence, are thus bound up with a philosophy in which naturalism is negated, and therefore with some form of idealism. But idealism is a word of many meanings, and indeed, in the history of speculation, idealistic theories have not maintained their unity of type to the same extent as materialism or naturalism has done. In the original meaning of the term, idealism is the theory that reality consists of ideas or universals, which are not themselves thoughts but the objects of thought. Among these ideas or universals, the great idealists from Plato onwards have always recognised those values on which our minds set store, and the nature of which has been already investigated such ideals as those of goodness, truth, and beauty. These, it is held, are the true realities and as such must persist eternally. The eternal validity of the ideas may have nothing to do with their realisation in consciousness. But at any rate they are somehow present in our consciousness here and now; and we are sustained by the assurance that the values which we cherish have a validity which is independent of their inadequate realisation in the world or recognition by its inhabitants.
Further,
in the great historical systems of this form of idealism, beginning with Plato
himself, mind is not left out of account in the final view of things. By way of
the ideas a synthesis is reached which combines all that is real and which can
be best described by the term consciousness or experience. This individual
whole which comprises all reality may therefore be described as Infinite Mind.
Herein the ideals which give dignity and worth to finite lives are eternally
real. If we live in the light of these ideals we shall rise above the petty
cares of our own, or other finite, selves; we shall cease to grumble at the
events of our world that curiously distorted appearance of reality and, by high
acquiescence in the eternal order we shall attain that 'intellectual love of
God' in which Spinoza placed our blessedness and freedom. In this way this
first form of idealism frequently finds expression in a pantheistic world-view.
The view of life which recognises the importance of the moral values, and the experience which acknowledges them and relies on their persistence, are thus bound up with a philosophy in which naturalism is negated, and therefore with some form of idealism. But idealism is a word of many meanings, and indeed, in the history of speculation, idealistic theories have not maintained their unity of type to the same extent as materialism or naturalism has done. In the original meaning of the term, idealism is the theory that reality consists of ideas or universals, which are not themselves thoughts but the objects of thought. Among these ideas or universals, the great idealists from Plato onwards have always recognised those values on which our minds set store, and the nature of which has been already investigated such ideals as those of goodness, truth, and beauty. These, it is held, are the true realities and as such must persist eternally. The eternal validity of the ideas may have nothing to do with their realisation in consciousness. But at any rate they are somehow present in our consciousness here and now; and we are sustained by the assurance that the values which we cherish have a validity which is independent of their inadequate realisation in the world or recognition by its inhabitants.
On
the other hand the second, or as it may be called Berkeleyan, form of idealism
starts from a pluralistic point of view. It does not attempt to construct
reality out of universals or ideas. It begins with the certainty of individual
or finite minds different centres of conscious life as our first clue to the
nature of reality and of value, and proceeds to construct its system of the
universe on that basis. If it reaches a theistic conclusion, its idea of God
will not be the idea of a system of universals but that of a conscious spirit
who can be in some degree understood through the analogy of finite mind. The
finite mind is thus of vastly more significance in this form of idealism than in
the other for which indeed it always remains a puzzle. The theory maintains the
reality of the finite self in which values are progressively apprehended and
realised; and its doctrine of God supports the faith that values will be
conserved in the world of our experience and in the consciousness of individual
minds, while, at the same time, it shows the unity and purpose that belong to
the course of the world and to the life of man. [476-78]
[Dan
nu terug naar het begin.]
THE PROBLEM
IHE purpose of the present work is to enquire into the bearing of ethical ideas upon the view of reality as a whole which we are justified in forming. The argument begins with a discussion of values and ends with the idea of God. In this way it reverses the traditional order of procedure which seeks first for an interpretation of reality, founded upon scientific generalisations or upon the conceptions involved in knowledge, and then goes on to draw out the ethical consequences of the view that has been reached. This traditional method has some advantage on the ground of simplicity. It concerns itself at first solely with what is and does not allow itself to be disturbed by the intrusion of the alien conception of value or of what ought to be. It is true also that the idea a man forms of the nature of things as a whole can hardly fail to affect his view as to what is of highest worth and thus lead on to ethical consequences. But, for this very reason, it is necessary that the basis of our theory of reality should be as broad and complete as possible; and it will lack breadth and completeness if moral facts and ideas have been excluded at the outset. The facts of morality as they appear in the world, and the ideas of good and evil found in man's consciousness, are among the data of experience. If we overlook them in constructing our theory of reality, we do so at the risk of leaving out something that is required for a view of the whole, and we shall probably find that our base is too narrow for the structure we build upon it. On this account it is desirable to fix attention on certain data which it has been customary to disregard in forming a philosophical theory and to enquire how far these data have a contribution to make towards determining our ultimate view of reality. [1-2]
Sometimes,
as by Spinoza, it [goodness ] is regarded as belonging to the knowledge and
realisation of one's own being as a mode of the ultimate reality. But, whatever
the subject of our proposition when we say "this being, or this kind of
life, or this attitude, is good," the predicate c good' enters as a new
notion which is superadded to, and not derived from, the logical or-
mathematical or causal relations already involved. Self- evidence may be
claimed for the ethical proposition itself, but it is never shown to be
logically implied by the antecedent propositions. [13] IHE purpose of the present work is to enquire into the bearing of ethical ideas upon the view of reality as a whole which we are justified in forming. The argument begins with a discussion of values and ends with the idea of God. In this way it reverses the traditional order of procedure which seeks first for an interpretation of reality, founded upon scientific generalisations or upon the conceptions involved in knowledge, and then goes on to draw out the ethical consequences of the view that has been reached. This traditional method has some advantage on the ground of simplicity. It concerns itself at first solely with what is and does not allow itself to be disturbed by the intrusion of the alien conception of value or of what ought to be. It is true also that the idea a man forms of the nature of things as a whole can hardly fail to affect his view as to what is of highest worth and thus lead on to ethical consequences. But, for this very reason, it is necessary that the basis of our theory of reality should be as broad and complete as possible; and it will lack breadth and completeness if moral facts and ideas have been excluded at the outset. The facts of morality as they appear in the world, and the ideas of good and evil found in man's consciousness, are among the data of experience. If we overlook them in constructing our theory of reality, we do so at the risk of leaving out something that is required for a view of the whole, and we shall probably find that our base is too narrow for the structure we build upon it. On this account it is desirable to fix attention on certain data which it has been customary to disregard in forming a philosophical theory and to enquire how far these data have a contribution to make towards determining our ultimate view of reality. [1-2]
PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS
On the other hand, a century before Hume, we have both Hobbes and Spinoza asserting that good is just a name which a man gives to whatever is the object of his desire; and, at the present day, a similar explanation is given by v. Ehrenfels in his treatise on the theory of value, as well as by many other writers. [55]
On the other hand, a century before Hume, we have both Hobbes and Spinoza asserting that good is just a name which a man gives to whatever is the object of his desire; and, at the present day, a similar explanation is given by v. Ehrenfels in his treatise on the theory of value, as well as by many other writers. [55]
THE
CONSERVATION OF VALUE
We cannot say of Berkeley, as we might of Aristotle or of Spinoza, that for him knowledge constituted the sole true good, the ultimate value. But he had certainly found in it intrinsic or independent value, not mere utility. To anyone without some share of his experience of the quest for truth and its satisfaction, the assertion of such intrinsic value in knowledge is meaningless. It was discovered slowly in the history of the race, and each man who enjoys it has to discover it for himself afresh. [162]
The
criticism of final causes, which we find in Bacon and Descartes and still more
in Spinoza, was too indiscriminately applied to all forms of the teleological
judgment, but it was justified of the methods against which it was primarily
directed. The final causes formerly and currently appealed to in the
explanation of nature were indeed like virgins dedicated to God, for they bore
no fruit. The progress of science required that this kind of appeal should be
dropped, in order that facts might be investigated by methods which admitted of
strict verification. The vindication of this impartial attitude resulted in the
long triumph of the mechanical view of nature a triumph somewhat disturbed in
our own day by the difficulty of adapting it to the description of vital
processes. [168] We cannot say of Berkeley, as we might of Aristotle or of Spinoza, that for him knowledge constituted the sole true good, the ultimate value. But he had certainly found in it intrinsic or independent value, not mere utility. To anyone without some share of his experience of the quest for truth and its satisfaction, the assertion of such intrinsic value in knowledge is meaningless. It was discovered slowly in the history of the race, and each man who enjoys it has to discover it for himself afresh. [162]
REASON AND UNDERSTANDING
It is in justifying their view of experience, or of reality, as a whole that many other thinkers have recognised the validity of the attitude of thought here called synoptic. The term is derived from Plato, and it describes the view of reality reached by vovs or reason as contrasted with that taken by Sicu>oia or understanding. The same conception is to be found in Spinoza's distinction of scientia intuitiva from ratio, and in the distinction between Reason and Understanding which was drawn by Kant and his successors, especially Schelling and Hegel, and which was popularised in this country by Coleridge; at the present day it reappears in M. Bergson's doctrine of Intuition which, as a mode of knowledge, he opposes to analysis and in general to intellect. The synoptic attitude has been in some respects differently conceived by these thinkers; and their greatest divergence from one another lies in their views concerning the relation of Reason or Intuition to Understanding or the process of reasoning. For the most part it is regarded as complementary to the understanding; and this is the classical view, from Plato onwards. M. Bergson, however, takes a different view. [255]
It is in justifying their view of experience, or of reality, as a whole that many other thinkers have recognised the validity of the attitude of thought here called synoptic. The term is derived from Plato, and it describes the view of reality reached by vovs or reason as contrasted with that taken by Sicu>oia or understanding. The same conception is to be found in Spinoza's distinction of scientia intuitiva from ratio, and in the distinction between Reason and Understanding which was drawn by Kant and his successors, especially Schelling and Hegel, and which was popularised in this country by Coleridge; at the present day it reappears in M. Bergson's doctrine of Intuition which, as a mode of knowledge, he opposes to analysis and in general to intellect. The synoptic attitude has been in some respects differently conceived by these thinkers; and their greatest divergence from one another lies in their views concerning the relation of Reason or Intuition to Understanding or the process of reasoning. For the most part it is regarded as complementary to the understanding; and this is the classical view, from Plato onwards. M. Bergson, however, takes a different view. [255]
SELF AND THE ENVIRONMENT
We start with the self. But the content of the self is due to its experience. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is only the external observer who could think of regarding this content as mere 'mental modifications’ To the subject it has a meaning which points beyond himself and, as it increases, brings him more and more into relation with other things. As Spinoza says, "the mind understands itself better the more things it understands in nature." [De intellectus emendatione; Opera, ed. Van Vloten and Land, vol. I (1882), p. 13.] It is characteristic of Spinoza to regard this connexion of mind with its environment as understanding simply, and to lay exclusive stress upon the natural objects which it knows. But it is unnecessary to follow him in these restrictions. The self finds itself in presence of surrounding reality, and has to make its own way in it as well as to form ideas about it. It is confronted with something that is both an obstacle to its activity and also the medium in and through which its purposes can be realised. It comes also to recognise an objective order or laws of nature to which it must conform and upon which it can depend. Further it is conscious of itself as one amongst others of the same kind, all living in the same objective world of matter and law. There is no moment in its career at which it is independent of these other selves any more than a time at which it is independent of the external world; and there is no part of its mental content which is intelligible altogether apart from them. And finally the self is conscious of an objective order of values, which determine what ought to be sought and avoided and thus give direction to the reactions upon external nature and other selves in which life consists. [269]
We start with the self. But the content of the self is due to its experience. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is only the external observer who could think of regarding this content as mere 'mental modifications’ To the subject it has a meaning which points beyond himself and, as it increases, brings him more and more into relation with other things. As Spinoza says, "the mind understands itself better the more things it understands in nature." [De intellectus emendatione; Opera, ed. Van Vloten and Land, vol. I (1882), p. 13.] It is characteristic of Spinoza to regard this connexion of mind with its environment as understanding simply, and to lay exclusive stress upon the natural objects which it knows. But it is unnecessary to follow him in these restrictions. The self finds itself in presence of surrounding reality, and has to make its own way in it as well as to form ideas about it. It is confronted with something that is both an obstacle to its activity and also the medium in and through which its purposes can be realised. It comes also to recognise an objective order or laws of nature to which it must conform and upon which it can depend. Further it is conscious of itself as one amongst others of the same kind, all living in the same objective world of matter and law. There is no moment in its career at which it is independent of these other selves any more than a time at which it is independent of the external world; and there is no part of its mental content which is intelligible altogether apart from them. And finally the self is conscious of an objective order of values, which determine what ought to be sought and avoided and thus give direction to the reactions upon external nature and other selves in which life consists. [269]
MONISM
AND PLURALISM
For Western thought Spinoza's system is the typical example of monism or pantheism. It is almost an accident that it is presented, and is commonly regarded by the historians, as being, at the same time, the typical example of rigid demonstration in philosophy. In Spinoza two great qualities were combined: the logical power which has command of abstract reasoning and can weld arguments into system, and, along with this, the vision of a seer. In respect of logic and system, however, it is impossible to regard his work as a faultless specimen of demonstration. He did succeed in developing with far greater consistency than Descartes the conceptions which he found in the latter's philosophy; but his leading positions have only the appearance of being demonstrated: they are already contained in his definitions, especially the definition of substance. His central idea of the All as One is not arrived at by ratiocination but by what he himself calls intuition. This is his vision, his point of view; and the compact body of propositions in which his thought is set forth is his impressive endeavour to show how the facts of material and mental existence can be seen from this point of view and find their place and explanation as modes of one eternal substance or reality. Nature and God are one merely different names for describing the sole ultimate reality, as conceived under different attributes or as seen from different points of view; all particular things, whether bodies or minds, can be nothing but modes of this one real being if indeed they are more than illusions. This is the general thesis of pantheism, and it is not difficult to see that it may be interpreted in different ways according to the aspect from which it is regarded. Looked at from the side of nature the universe may be held to be simply the interconnected world of physical science. On the other hand this diversity itself may be said to be only an appearance; and reality may be interpreted as a unity somewhat after the fashion of the spirit of man, so that it may be possible for man to realise his being in union with the whole. In taking over from Descartes the doctrine that extension and thought have nothing in common, and in regarding them as two attributes of the One Substance, Spinoza brought into prominence, and attempted to bring into unity, these divergent interpretations. His own thought, however, is in unstable equilibrium between them, and it oscillates uneasily from one interpretation to the other. On the one hand there is the tendency to lay stress on the aspect of extension and of the material bodies which are the modes of substance as extended. This region forms a mechanical system in which causal connexions can be traced and verified. And as the attribute of thought, and minds which are its modes, correspond exactly with this mechanical region, they also may be interpreted mechanically. Thus matter is given the primacy. This primacy is still further brought out by the point-to-point parallelism of matter and mind. For the ideas which make up mind are all of them held to be ideas of the body; so that, although they have their own causal sequence, they are bound to body in a way in which body cannot be shown to be bound to mind. In this way it is not surprising that freedom should disappear, and that goodness should be regarded as merely a name for whatever is useful or the object of desire. But alongside of this there is an entirely different train of thought. Mind, which was first represented as merely an idea of its own body, may yet have an adequate knowledge of the attributes of God or substance; in so far as it has this knowledge it partakes of the eternity of its object; there is something in mind which does not disappear with the body 1 although mind is only an idea of the body 2 . And its blessedness is consummated in the intellectual love of God which is a part of the love wherewith God loves himself. [379-382]
For Western thought Spinoza's system is the typical example of monism or pantheism. It is almost an accident that it is presented, and is commonly regarded by the historians, as being, at the same time, the typical example of rigid demonstration in philosophy. In Spinoza two great qualities were combined: the logical power which has command of abstract reasoning and can weld arguments into system, and, along with this, the vision of a seer. In respect of logic and system, however, it is impossible to regard his work as a faultless specimen of demonstration. He did succeed in developing with far greater consistency than Descartes the conceptions which he found in the latter's philosophy; but his leading positions have only the appearance of being demonstrated: they are already contained in his definitions, especially the definition of substance. His central idea of the All as One is not arrived at by ratiocination but by what he himself calls intuition. This is his vision, his point of view; and the compact body of propositions in which his thought is set forth is his impressive endeavour to show how the facts of material and mental existence can be seen from this point of view and find their place and explanation as modes of one eternal substance or reality. Nature and God are one merely different names for describing the sole ultimate reality, as conceived under different attributes or as seen from different points of view; all particular things, whether bodies or minds, can be nothing but modes of this one real being if indeed they are more than illusions. This is the general thesis of pantheism, and it is not difficult to see that it may be interpreted in different ways according to the aspect from which it is regarded. Looked at from the side of nature the universe may be held to be simply the interconnected world of physical science. On the other hand this diversity itself may be said to be only an appearance; and reality may be interpreted as a unity somewhat after the fashion of the spirit of man, so that it may be possible for man to realise his being in union with the whole. In taking over from Descartes the doctrine that extension and thought have nothing in common, and in regarding them as two attributes of the One Substance, Spinoza brought into prominence, and attempted to bring into unity, these divergent interpretations. His own thought, however, is in unstable equilibrium between them, and it oscillates uneasily from one interpretation to the other. On the one hand there is the tendency to lay stress on the aspect of extension and of the material bodies which are the modes of substance as extended. This region forms a mechanical system in which causal connexions can be traced and verified. And as the attribute of thought, and minds which are its modes, correspond exactly with this mechanical region, they also may be interpreted mechanically. Thus matter is given the primacy. This primacy is still further brought out by the point-to-point parallelism of matter and mind. For the ideas which make up mind are all of them held to be ideas of the body; so that, although they have their own causal sequence, they are bound to body in a way in which body cannot be shown to be bound to mind. In this way it is not surprising that freedom should disappear, and that goodness should be regarded as merely a name for whatever is useful or the object of desire. But alongside of this there is an entirely different train of thought. Mind, which was first represented as merely an idea of its own body, may yet have an adequate knowledge of the attributes of God or substance; in so far as it has this knowledge it partakes of the eternity of its object; there is something in mind which does not disappear with the body 1 although mind is only an idea of the body 2 . And its blessedness is consummated in the intellectual love of God which is a part of the love wherewith God loves himself. [379-382]
1 Spinoza, Ethica, v, 23. 2 Ibid., II 13.
THE ABSOLUTE ONE
Neither the philosophical elaboration of pantheism, as we find it in a writer like Spinoza, nor its working as a religious view of the world, can be rightly estimated if we neglect either of these sides of the doctrine the side which points to mysticism or that which allies itself with naturalism. The doctrine is a doctrine of unity; but it is a unity which contains in itself all diversity and multiplicity. The absolute One is in strictness ineffable; determination of it implies negation and therefore interferes with its positive perfection ; any assertion with the absolute as subject brings the absolute into relation to a predicate and thus destroys its absoluteness. The absolute One should be treated as strictly ineffable. But, if it is to be described at all, it cannot be described otherwise than by means of that manifold world of appearance which is somehow its manifestation. Consequently, the doctrine must be understood by means of the way in which the concrete world is regarded as manifesting the one reality.
A
view of the infinite, or of the whole, must be judged by the adequacy of the
explanation which it is able to give of the finite or of the parts. We may therefore
test it by its application to the different divisions of reality as finite
which have been distinguished. In the first place, the realm of material
things, living creatures, and persons will be regarded, on the monistic theory,
as modes of the being of that one ultimate reality in which everything must
have being. This is so far simple, as soon as we have granted that the Absolute
can have and has modes. How this is possible how the absolute One can manifest
itself in a finite many is not a whit easier to understand than the doctrine of
creation or any other substitute for it. But particular things undoubtedly
exist in some fashion; and, when their existence is explained by the theory
that they are modes of a single absolute reality, what we have to do is to
enquire how this explanation explains their particularity and their differences
from one another. The problem is therefore how to draw lines of discrimination
between the various modes. The distinction between modes of extension, or
bodies, and modes of thought, or minds, goes a little way only in this
direction; it entails difficulties of its own ; and it applies chiefly to that
special form of monistic doctrine which arose out of the dualism of Descartes.
[382-84] Neither the philosophical elaboration of pantheism, as we find it in a writer like Spinoza, nor its working as a religious view of the world, can be rightly estimated if we neglect either of these sides of the doctrine the side which points to mysticism or that which allies itself with naturalism. The doctrine is a doctrine of unity; but it is a unity which contains in itself all diversity and multiplicity. The absolute One is in strictness ineffable; determination of it implies negation and therefore interferes with its positive perfection ; any assertion with the absolute as subject brings the absolute into relation to a predicate and thus destroys its absoluteness. The absolute One should be treated as strictly ineffable. But, if it is to be described at all, it cannot be described otherwise than by means of that manifold world of appearance which is somehow its manifestation. Consequently, the doctrine must be understood by means of the way in which the concrete world is regarded as manifesting the one reality.
MONISM AND THE MORAL ORDER
The doctrine that all is one can make no terms with contingency. The order of nature must be as necessary as the laws of logic; the processes of mind and society must have the same fixed order as mechanical necessity. Spinoza professed to treat the actions and desires of men just as if the question were of lines, planes, and solids 1 ; and, from his point of view, he was perfectly justified; the unity of reality will be interfered with if necessary connexion is relaxed or room is left for individual initiative. If physical science aspires to be a philosophy, and is not content with naturalism, it may find in monism a fitting metaphysical refuge.
But
when we pass from these relations to the diverse order of moral values and
moral law, difficulties begin afresh. For in morality we have a discrimination
of higher and lower, of good and evil, which does not find an easy explanation
in a system where everything is equally essential. Yet it is from the ethical
point of view that the system has to be approached here, as offering a solution
of the problem of reality which might be accepted as an alternative to theism.
God (if the word is used at all) may be regarded as the moral order of the
universe: though we see now that this can hardly be a complete definition. If the
natural order of the universe is real, then God must equally be this natural
order; and, similarly, the logical order also. If we do not admit this view,
and if we distinguish one of these orders from the others, then we must enquire
into their relation. If each order has a different ultimate ground then we have
no universe, only a multiverse ; if they have the same ultimate ground and it
transcends each of them, then we are on the high-way towards theism. The
doctrine of the All as One must in some way harmonise the natural, logical, and
moral orders, and do so without going beyond them to the conception of
consciousness or personality.The doctrine that all is one can make no terms with contingency. The order of nature must be as necessary as the laws of logic; the processes of mind and society must have the same fixed order as mechanical necessity. Spinoza professed to treat the actions and desires of men just as if the question were of lines, planes, and solids 1 ; and, from his point of view, he was perfectly justified; the unity of reality will be interfered with if necessary connexion is relaxed or room is left for individual initiative. If physical science aspires to be a philosophy, and is not content with naturalism, it may find in monism a fitting metaphysical refuge.
But can we in this way identify the moral order and the order of nature? "God or nature " Spinoza's favourite phrase conveys a meaning; "God or the moral order" which might represent Fichte's view also conveys a meaning; but if by "God" we mean at the same time both the natural and the moral order, are we not using the name to cover a contradiction?
It was because Kant was impressed by the discrepancy between the realm of nature with its strict causal connexions and the moral order with its categorical imperative, that he postulated a God transcending the natural order and yet with the power required to bring that order into harmony with morality. [386-87]
THE EXCLUSION OF PURPOSE
Each individual thing, Spinoza thinks, seeks to preserve its being a truth equally manifested by the stone which offers resistance to the blows of the hammer and by the animal or man that resists disease or death. But it is clear that mere inertia does not express the whole truth about any living being, as contrasted with the inorganic thing. The living being seeks not merely preservation but growth or expansion greater fulness or excellence of being. Here growth (though growth followed by decay) is the law, as change of a regular kind is the law in the inorganic realm; and in the life of mind the growth is mediated by an idea of value a purpose. But from our conception of the world s a whole the idea of purpose is excluded. The world must be regarded as eternally complete and not as tending towards a more perfect state
Purpose
then is excluded. The world must not be interpreted by means of the result
which it is fitted to bring forth in the fulness of time. Time cannot thus be
of its essence. We must view it as it is, and in this view the moment of time
at which we regard it is indifferent. It is a whole and, as a whole, must be
perfect : for perfection means simply completeness of reality; and all reality
is here. As substance or essence, reality is one; as manifestation or
appearance what Spinoza [Epist. 64] calls facies
totius universi it is seen as a changing manifold, but a manifold to which
nothing can be added and from which nothing can be taken away. It is the
perfect manifestation of the One. The whole world is essential to this perfect
manifestation ; we cannot dispense with any part. Sin and suffering are there,
constitutive fragments of the whole; and as such they must be accepted as
belonging to it and contributing to its perfection. From the point of view of
natural law this conclusion creates no difficulty. But it is inconsistent with
the conditions of moral law, which requires the conquest of sin or evil and the
realisation of goodness. The moral order and the natural order are therefore in
conflict; and no provision is made for transcending their opposition. [389]Each individual thing, Spinoza thinks, seeks to preserve its being a truth equally manifested by the stone which offers resistance to the blows of the hammer and by the animal or man that resists disease or death. But it is clear that mere inertia does not express the whole truth about any living being, as contrasted with the inorganic thing. The living being seeks not merely preservation but growth or expansion greater fulness or excellence of being. Here growth (though growth followed by decay) is the law, as change of a regular kind is the law in the inorganic realm; and in the life of mind the growth is mediated by an idea of value a purpose. But from our conception of the world s a whole the idea of purpose is excluded. The world must be regarded as eternally complete and not as tending towards a more perfect state
GOOD AND EVIL
A consistent monism, accordingly, cannot admit the equal validity of the order of natural law and of that of moral law. It must throw over one or the other. It may conceivably adopt the heroic device of discarding the whole realm of nature and the laws of nature as an illusion; but the illusion is too insistent in our experience to allow of this alternative being carried out fully. We cannot look upon the moral order as the only reality. Even if we are willing to declare that pain is no evil, it is harder to say that sin does not exist. Evil of all kinds, sin among the rest, may indeed be held to be mere negation, without any share in positive reality. But, even as negation, evil is a failure to give actual existence to those values which demand realisation; it is still an incompleteness, an imperfection, in the manifestation of the moral order: and as such is an obstacle to consistent monism. And if the natural order is not sacrificed to the moral, then the moral order must be sacrificed to it, and morality must be allowed to lapse into naturalism. This was the line taken by Spinoza when he followed out the implications of his point of view as a logical thinker. Good and evil become, in this way, as they became for him [Ethica, iv, pref], mere figments of our way of thinking shadows cast by our desires upon the impenetrable barrier of natural law. To the order of the universe as a whole these conceptions do not belong. The claim of the moral order to a validity independent of human feeling and desire is relinquished. 'Ought’ and 'value’ and 'good’ involve distinctions which unfit them as names for a universal objective order. They must be given up when we speak of the whole or of the order which constitutes the whole. Here 'is' is the only word; and our monistic view no longer pretends to make morality an ultimate constituent of reality. [390-91]
The
conclusion, accordingly, is that a monism such as Spinoza's, or any similar
doctrine, does not provide the view of reality of which we are in search a view
in which the moral order as well as the natural order will be recognised as
valid. And the reason for the failure of the doctrine may be traced back to its
denial of any real purpose in the universe. We may therefore look back and ask
whether, after all, it may not be possible to interpret the world as purposive
and yet to understand it as one, after the manner of the monist. At first
sight, at any rate, it does not appear impossible. For it has to be admitted
that purpose does enter into the world in the actions of human beings. Why
should we limit its operation to them? This is not a question of the evidence
for its presence elsewhere, but only of the logical conceivability of that
presence. Seeing that the One Absolute Reality manifests itself as a time-process,
why should we say that purpose may appear in one part of the timeprocess,
namely, human activity, but not in any other part of it? There seems no good
reason. And if the notion may be extended to any portion of the timeprocess,
may it not also be applied to the time-process as a whole? A consistent monism, accordingly, cannot admit the equal validity of the order of natural law and of that of moral law. It must throw over one or the other. It may conceivably adopt the heroic device of discarding the whole realm of nature and the laws of nature as an illusion; but the illusion is too insistent in our experience to allow of this alternative being carried out fully. We cannot look upon the moral order as the only reality. Even if we are willing to declare that pain is no evil, it is harder to say that sin does not exist. Evil of all kinds, sin among the rest, may indeed be held to be mere negation, without any share in positive reality. But, even as negation, evil is a failure to give actual existence to those values which demand realisation; it is still an incompleteness, an imperfection, in the manifestation of the moral order: and as such is an obstacle to consistent monism. And if the natural order is not sacrificed to the moral, then the moral order must be sacrificed to it, and morality must be allowed to lapse into naturalism. This was the line taken by Spinoza when he followed out the implications of his point of view as a logical thinker. Good and evil become, in this way, as they became for him [Ethica, iv, pref], mere figments of our way of thinking shadows cast by our desires upon the impenetrable barrier of natural law. To the order of the universe as a whole these conceptions do not belong. The claim of the moral order to a validity independent of human feeling and desire is relinquished. 'Ought’ and 'value’ and 'good’ involve distinctions which unfit them as names for a universal objective order. They must be given up when we speak of the whole or of the order which constitutes the whole. Here 'is' is the only word; and our monistic view no longer pretends to make morality an ultimate constituent of reality. [390-91]
How time or change can enter at all into the manifestation of the Absolute Reality is, of course, an unsolved problem; and as such may be allowed to pass without further remark. But it is a fact that the " appearance of the whole universe'' (to use Spinoza's phrase) as known to us, is in process of change; and there does not seem to be any graver logical difficulty in conceiving it under the conception of purpose than in conceiving it (as we must) under the conception of change. The fundamental notion in Spinoza's philosophy that of Substance may be inconsistent with purpose in the sum-total of the modes of Substance, but it is also hard to reconcile with change within this sum-total, or with purpose anywhere in it both of which he is obliged to admit. And, if we discard Substance as the fundamental notion, and substitute for it the notion of activity or that of subject, the idea of purpose may appear more in harmony with the general world-view. [391-92]
THE WORLD OF NECESSITY
It is this sense of the inadequacy of the world to the values on which the human mind sets greatest store that has given strength to the mystical tendency found in all the higher representatives of that spiritual form of monism which we call pantheism. And this tendency is best illustrated by Spinoza himself. Discarding the imaginative picture of things which suffices for common sense, looking beyond even the rational or scientific view of phenomena in their causal connexions, he seeks intellectual satisfaction in his vision of the substance of all things, a substance which is One and is by him called God. Whatever happens, he will endeavour to understand it as proceeding from one of the infinite attributes of God, and thus understanding it his mind will be filled with an intellectual satisfaction or intellectual love; and as this love is part of the love wherewith God loves himself, he will both be, and feel himself to be, one with the infinite whole. Anything whatever whether we call it good or evil in our experience can be made contributory to this mystic union. We have only to understand it as proceeding from God, and the understanding moves us to joy and love.
This
attitude, be it noted, is not a moral but a religious attitude. [398] It is this sense of the inadequacy of the world to the values on which the human mind sets greatest store that has given strength to the mystical tendency found in all the higher representatives of that spiritual form of monism which we call pantheism. And this tendency is best illustrated by Spinoza himself. Discarding the imaginative picture of things which suffices for common sense, looking beyond even the rational or scientific view of phenomena in their causal connexions, he seeks intellectual satisfaction in his vision of the substance of all things, a substance which is One and is by him called God. Whatever happens, he will endeavour to understand it as proceeding from one of the infinite attributes of God, and thus understanding it his mind will be filled with an intellectual satisfaction or intellectual love; and as this love is part of the love wherewith God loves himself, he will both be, and feel himself to be, one with the infinite whole. Anything whatever whether we call it good or evil in our experience can be made contributory to this mystic union. We have only to understand it as proceeding from God, and the understanding moves us to joy and love.
THE IDEA OF GOD AND GOD AND FINITE MINDS
The most coherent system of the unity of all things, such as Spinoza's, is never able to explain how there comes to be a finite world at all, or how its reality can be reconciled with the reality of the One Substance. In producing finite beings, or in manifesting itself in such appearances, their source or originating principle must be determined either by something outside itself or else simply by its own nature. The former alternative is impossible on any theory of the unity of all reality; the latter means self-limitation. Appearance in finite form means limitation of the infinite, and that limitation can only be due to the infinite's own nature or agency. To deny the power of the infinite thus to limit itself is to deny the infinity of its power, and besides is to render the existence of the finite impossible. And to allow that the infinite can by self-limitation manifest itself in or produce finite beings, but at the same time to deny its power to create free minds as distinct from minds whose future is determined from the beginning, seems an arbitrary limitation of the divine power. Omnipotence, it would seem, is not inconsistent with human freedom ; on the contrary to deny the possibility of creating beings who are both finite and free is to restrict the power of the infinite being and thus to render it finite. [483-84]
The most coherent system of the unity of all things, such as Spinoza's, is never able to explain how there comes to be a finite world at all, or how its reality can be reconciled with the reality of the One Substance. In producing finite beings, or in manifesting itself in such appearances, their source or originating principle must be determined either by something outside itself or else simply by its own nature. The former alternative is impossible on any theory of the unity of all reality; the latter means self-limitation. Appearance in finite form means limitation of the infinite, and that limitation can only be due to the infinite's own nature or agency. To deny the power of the infinite thus to limit itself is to deny the infinity of its power, and besides is to render the existence of the finite impossible. And to allow that the infinite can by self-limitation manifest itself in or produce finite beings, but at the same time to deny its power to create free minds as distinct from minds whose future is determined from the beginning, seems an arbitrary limitation of the divine power. Omnipotence, it would seem, is not inconsistent with human freedom ; on the contrary to deny the possibility of creating beings who are both finite and free is to restrict the power of the infinite being and thus to render it finite. [483-84]
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