Martin Lin, videostill 2015 |
Over
Martin Lin, nu Associate Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University,
New Brunswick. had ik al eerder blogs (zie onder). Recent uploadde hij naar wel
drie plaatsen op internet zijn artikel of hoofdstuk
Martin
Lin, “The Many Faces of Spinoza's Causal Axiom.” In: Sebastian Bender and
Dominik Perler (ed.), Causation and
Cognition in Early Modern Philosophy. New York: Routledge (forthcoming) [PDF
philpapers, PDF philarchive en academia.edu]
Het betreft zijn bijdrage aan de conferentie "Causation and Cognition in Early Modern Philosophy" die van 31 mei t/m 2 juni 2018 in Berlijn werd gehouden [cf.] en waarvan dus een boek wordt samengesteld.
Het betreft zijn bijdrage aan de conferentie "Causation and Cognition in Early Modern Philosophy" die van 31 mei t/m 2 juni 2018 in Berlijn werd gehouden [cf.] en waarvan dus een boek wordt samengesteld.
Zijn bijdrage begint aldus: “Cognition of the effect depends on and implies cognition of its
cause,” announces Spinoza in 1a4 of his Ethics.1 This axiom,
known as “Spinoza’s causal axiom,” is one of the most important in the Ethics.
It plays a central role in Spinoza’s arguments for some of his most important
doctrines, including (1) that things with nothing in common cannot causally
interact; (2) that we have sense perception of the external causes of our
bodily states; (3) that we have adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and
infinite essence; and (4) that the order and connection of ideas is the same as
the order and connection of things. It would, thus, appear that a single axiom
bears a tremendous amount of weight in Spinoza’s metaphysical system.
In what follows,
I will explore how Spinoza uses the axiom to argue for the four doctrines
mentioned above, and I will argue that it cannot be given a consistent
interpretation that allows it to play all the roles that he assigns to it. In
particular, whereas there is a single interpretation that makes sense of
(1)–(3), there is no way to make the causal axiom consistent with both those
doctrines and the role Spinoza assigns it in securing (4). I will argue,
however, that this does not present an insuperable problem for Spinoza, because
he has a better argument for the parallelism that relies not on the causal
axiom but rather on mode identity. I conclude by considering the underlying
philosophical motivations for the causal axiom and argue that it is an
expression of a coherent and attractive view of the relationship between
causation and causal explanation.”
De slotalinea luidt:
“Spinoza
causal axiom is thus a complex principle that is, in the context of his system,
at war with itself. It entails one principle about implication and another
about causal dependence. As we have seen, the principle concerning implication
is an important doctrine that is essential to No Interaction, Sense Perception,
and Knowledge of God and has a clear and appealing philosophical motivation. In
contrast, the principle concerning causal dependence fails in the one job it is
asked to do—secure Parallelism—and lacks any compelling motivation. What is
more, given his other commitments, the causal dependence principle and the
implication principle cannot both be true. We
must conclude that the clause about causal dependence in the causal axiom was a
misstep and Spinoza would do well by rejecting it. An axiom that merely
said that cognition of the cause is implied by cognition of the effect would
provide Spinoza everything he needs while protecting him from the disastrous consequences of his
original formulation.” [vet van mij, SV]
Daartussen
een ingenieuze analyse van Spinoza’s axioma 1/ax4 en hoe hij dit zelf toepast.
Helder geschreven, maar door het hoge abstractieniveau van de inhoud niet
altijd eenvoudig te volgen: het vergt nogal concentratie.
Zijn
boek is op komst:
Martin Lin, Being and Reason: an essay on Spinoza's
metaphysics. Bij Oxford University Press staat het aangekondigd voor 25 April 2019 (Estimated). En verder:
• Gives a detailed a systematic reconstruction of many of the central issues in Spinoza's metaphysics
• Defends a realist interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics
• Goes against many recent idealist readings and corrects misapprehensions about the content of Spinoza's philosophy
________________
Eerdere blogs
over Martin Lin• Gives a detailed a systematic reconstruction of many of the central issues in Spinoza's metaphysics
• Defends a realist interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics
• Goes against many recent idealist readings and corrects misapprehensions about the content of Spinoza's philosophy
________________
22-06-2008: Spinoza's vrijmakende ketterij - met link naar Review
van Nadler's Spinoza's Heresy door Martin Lin (University of Toronto) op Notre
Dame Philosophical Reviews
07-17-04-2012: Martin Lin - een productieve jonge
Spinozascholar
07-01-2017: Martin Lin over "Spinoza's
panpsychisme"
28-02-2017: Spinoza’s denken over oordelen en willen
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