Wanneer Stephanie Marston haar PhD-thesis aan het Birkbeck College van de University of London verdedigde, kan ik niet vinden, maar dat zal in mei of juni van dit jaar geweest kunnen zijn.
Bij een review van haar dat - gedateerd 26 juni 2019 - op marxandphilosophy.org.uk verscheen, werd meegedeeld: “Steph Marston has recently completed her PhD on Spinoza’s political philosophy at Birkbeck.”
Ook
haar academia-edu-pagina
geeft daar geen informatie over. Wel geeft ze er teksten van lezingen over Spinoza die ze de laatste jaren gaf.
Hoe
dan ook, vandaag verscheen op ‘Orbit’ [en werd dat via deze tweet wereldkundig gemaakt] het PDF van haar dissertatie, Enacting Knowledge: Spinoza’s Dynamic of
Politics.
Abstract: The central claims of my
thesis are that Spinoza’s philosophy of mind and affect entails that human
knowledge is distinctively creative; and that understanding this makes it
possible to understand Spinoza’s political philosophy as grounded in the
interplay between knowing and the effects of knowledge. I develop the arguments
underpinning these claims to show that the tensions commonly perceived in
Spinoza’s political philosophy are a manifestation of its dynamism and
creativity.
The first part of my thesis proposes that, within Spinoza’s
metaphysics, individual modes should be understood as distinguished by their
effects on other modes, rather than by essence. I proceed from this
interpretive premise to an explication of Spinoza’s theory of knowledge:
situating it within the philosophy of mind adumbrated in Part 2 of the Ethics, I develop a reading of Spinoza’s
epistemology as a theory of ‘affective knowing’. I argue that his account of
knowledge formation implies a necessary interdependence among the three kinds
of knowledge discussed in E2p40s2, with all knowledge shaped by both the
knower’s encounters with other modes and her own acting. A significant
implication of this interpretation is that in Spinoza’s philosophy the
political is never static but is constantly created, reinterpreted and
re-formed. I show that my interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of knowledge may
be used as a framework to resolve problems identified in secondary literature
on Spinoza’s political philosophy, by showing that the tensions within it are
productive rather than problematic. I conclude that Spinoza’s philosophy
generates a situated normativity for politics without recourse to narratives of
governmental legitimacy.
