In
aansluiting op het vorige blog, breng ik, zoals aangekondigd, een in mijn
ogen aardige tekst over een debatje tussen ‘modern’ orthodoxe rabbijnen over
Spinoza. Daarover is veel te vinden in dit al vermelde boek
Dov
Schwartz, Faith at the Crossroads: A
Theological Profile of Religious Zionism. BRILL, 2002 – books.google].
In
Chapter Three:, “The Dialectic View of Spinoza,”[p. 90 – 130] staat de volgende
boeiende paragraaf, §
5. Tug of War: Was Spinoza a Materialist?, die ik hierbij overneem.
Daarin
worden de namen genoemd van enige rabbijnen, die ik in het vorigen blog al noemde,
zoals Rav Kook. Maar vooral gaat het over rabbijn Samuel Alexandrov (1865 - 1941) een verlichte joodse orhodoxe rabbijn en essayist in het Hebreeuws – een individualist en anarchist volgens wiki [foto van commons.wiki] en rabbbijn Reuven Egushewitz, over wie verder niets te vinden is.
zoals Rav Kook. Maar vooral gaat het over rabbijn Samuel Alexandrov (1865 - 1941) een verlichte joodse orhodoxe rabbijn en essayist in het Hebreeuws – een individualist en anarchist volgens wiki [foto van commons.wiki] en rabbbijn Reuven Egushewitz, over wie verder niets te vinden is.
5. Tug of War: Was Spinoza a
Materialist?
Samuel
Alexandrov dealt extensively with the value of materialism and its historical
standing in the context of modern heresy. Research shows that Alexandrov
pointed to a sharp contrast between materialism and the foundations of Judaism.
Nevertheless, he assigned modern materialism a built-in dialectic role in the
hands of divine providence, in the shape of the absolute heresy that precedes
the return to true faith.
How
does Spinoza's doctrine fit in the map of heresies? Alexandrov lists Spinoza
among materialist philosophers. In a letter to Joseph Gutman, he suggests three
approaches concerning the relationship between God and the world, anchoring
them in the saying "pervades all worlds, surrounds all worlds." According
to Alexandrov, the correct doctrine understands this phrase literally: God is
everywhere, yet at the same time is transcendent (namely, panentheism). The two
other perceptions are mistaken. One sees God as transcendent and never intervening
in the world; God only "surrounds all worlds." The other is "the
view of Spinoza and the pantheists," who "only admit that He
`pervades all worlds' and deny that He 'surrounds all worlds,' and this is the
notion claiming that God and the universe are one."
In
developing this idea, ascribed to Spinoza, Alexandrov categorically stated that
pantheism and materialism sprout from the same root, that is, from the
"pervades all worlds" approach: "And furthermore, the source of
materialism is also in the `pervades all worlds' view, as we know." He
then turns to Gutman in blunt and forceful terms: "No wonder, then, that
you do not cling at all to this 'necessary' God."
Like
Gefen and Kook, Alexandrov saw a clear linkage between Spinoza and materialism.
Note that, despite the dialectic role that he assigned to materialism,
Alexandrov still saw its Marxist manifestations as a serious threat to Judaism
in the present. Spinoza's doctrine is thus presented in materialistic and as
such, negative terms. Nevertheless, some thinkers disagreed with Alexandrov's
view and even questioned it; the most thorough and systematic was Reuven
Egushewitz.
Egushewitz
was well aware that Spinoza's name was associated with materialism, and strove
to refute this association. He devoted his treatise Faith and Heresy to a critique of materialism. In the introduction
to his work, Egushewithz lists his motives for writing the book. He sees
current events, particularly the establishment of the State of Israel, as the
fulfillment of a "vision of final redemption" and as miraculous
divine providence. Some, however, deny the reality of miracles and base their
outlook on materialism, and Egushewitz attacks them in this book. Egushewitz,
then, is not afraid to draw a connection between his attitude to philosophy and
his religious-Zionist outlook.
Egushewitz
rejects the claim that Spinoza's doctrine could be viewed as part of modern
materialism. When analyzing the fundamentals of materialism, Egushewitz
distinguished between ancient and modern materialistic views. In his view,
ancient materialism contended that matter is the sole reality. Nature is merely
the total of material processes unfolding within it. Hence, there is no spiritual
realm, nor any systematic need for one. Modern materialism, on the other hand,
could not accept such a thesis because it faced the Newtonian discovery of
force. These forces act upon matter even without any direct
"material" contact. Material existence, therefore, is not epitomized
in the stream of matter, but rather in the addition of a
"supra-material" entity, which is force. In response to the discovery
of force, modern materialism was compelled to argue that material substance is
homogeneous. The distinction between force and matter is only nominal; in fact,
there is no difference between matter and force. Modern materialists, said
Egushewitz, rely on Spinoza for the claim that "force and matter are
perceived as two manifestations of the same 'thing,' so that force is in
essence matter, and matter is essentially force." He therefore devoted the
chapter of his book entitled "Spinoza's Metaphysics" to a discussion
of whether Spinoza's doctrine is indeed materialistic, and whether modern
materialists were correct in adhering to it so closely.
Egushewitz
argued that we must reconsider the concept of attribute. An attribute is an
expression of the substance on a certain plane. The infinite attributes of the
substance have infinite planes, and every one of these planes has infinite
modes. Yet the attributes are expressions of one unified, simple substance, for
if the substance were complex, its parts would be either infinite or finite.
The former option is void because infinity does not allow for differentiation
and distinction, and if the part were infinite, there would not be room for any
others; the latter option is also void, since there could be no infinite
substance composed of finite parts. The substance, then, is homogeneous; and if
the substance is unified, its attributes, which are manifestations of the
substance, are also unified. The attribute of extension, then, lacks any
materialistic connotation, for it is infinite and devoid of any
differentiation.
Egushewitz
concludes that Spinoza is not a realist. On the other hand, it is inconceivable
that Spinoza was a radical idealist, a philosopher who views space as merely an
idea. Egushewitz's explanation is rather vague:
The issue is that both of them [extension and thought]
express different "languages," through which the substance
"makes known" to our mind that it exists. It expresses this through
thought, and also through representation, for we grasp reality through both
these "languages."
Apparently,
Egushewitz found no fitting answer to his query. If space is only a mental
conception, Spinoza still remains a radical idealist. Furthermore, these
remarks should not be interpreted in Kantian terms, whereby space is a form of
sensibility, for the subject here is a divine attribute rather than
transcendental space. In any event, Egushewitz argued that the attribute of extension
is not material, since it applies to a pure conceptual space and is
indivisible. In his view, this analysis of the attribute of extension is
sufficient to exclude Spinoza from the materialist category:
Spinoza's premise that space and thought are manifestations
of the same essence is due to his non-realistic outlook that space is not the
same divisible space we construe but rather something we cannot imagine,
because in all our images we grasp divisible space. Are materialists prepared
to accept this non-realistic outlook concerning force and matter? Are they
willing to admit that matter is something we cannot imagine?
Egushewitz,
like Hirschensohn, acquits Spinoza by developing and substantiating the notion
that the attribute of extension does not apply to the material world and its
particulars and, therefore, does not lead to anthropomorphism. As noted,
Hirschensohn's attitude toward Spinoza was ambivalent: he did not blur the
problematic areas of Spinoza's philosophy and emphasized its errors as he saw
them. Whereas Hirschensohn attempted to leave out Spinoza from the list of
heretics and anthropomorphists, Egushewitz discarded even the claim that he was
mistaken. Egushewitz argued at the beginning of his book that materialism is a
stumbling block to the Zionist and national endeavor, but Spinoza is not an
obstacle at all. Although Egushewitz's attitude toward Spinoza differs from
that of his predecessors, and Alexandrov in particular, he did not relate to
Spinoza's theological-political doctrine and confined himself to the metaphysical
realm.
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