zondag 16 juli 2017

Spinoza's 'Ethics': A Critical Guide begint met de kwestie van de zgn. identiteitsthese


In het blog van 09-01-2017 kondigde ik aan: In mei zal Spinoza's 'Ethics': A Critical Guide verschijnen.

En intussen ís op 25 mei j.l. verschenen:
Yitzhak Y. Melamed (Ed.), Spinoza's ‘Ethics'. A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press [Series; Cambridge Critical Guides], May 2017 – books.google Bij amazon kost het $99.99 en bij bookdepository € 86,71. Cover, inhoud en Inleiding op academia.edu

Spinozas Ethics, published in 1677, is considered his greatest work and one of historys most influential philosophical books. This volume brings established scholars together with new voices to engage with the complex system of philosophy Spinoza proposed in his masterpiece. Topics including identity, thought, free will, perfection, and the affects are all addressed, as individual chapters investigate the key themes of the Ethics and combine to offer readers a fresh and thought-provoking view of the work as a whole. Written in a clear and accessible style, this volume sets out cutting-edge research that reflects, challenges, and promotes the most recent scholarly advances in the field of Spinoza studies, tackling old issues and bringing to light new subjects for debate.

Contents
Introduction - Yitzhak Y. Melamed [PDF]

1 The Indiscernibility of Identicals and the Transitivity of Identity in Spinoza’s Logic of the Attributes - Don Garrett [ pdf op BookSC ]

2 Spinoza and Maimonides on Teleology and Anthropocentrism - Warren Zev Harvey [PDF op BookSC ]

3 Two Puzzles about Thought and Identity in Spinoza - John Morrison [PDF ook op BookSC]

4 Spinoza and the Mark of the Mental - Martin Lin [pdf ook op BOOkSC ]

5 The “Physical” Interlude - Alison Peterman [ PDF op BookSC ]

6 The Causes of Our Belief in Free Will: Spinoza on Necessary, “Innate,” yet False Cognition  - Yitzhak Y. Melamed  [PDF ook op Booksc ]

7 Conatus ‘- John Carriero [ PDF OP bOOKSC ]

8 Scientia Intuitiva in the Ethics - Kristin Primus [ PDF op BookSC ]

9 “Causa Conscientiae” in Spinoza’s Ethics - Lia Levy [ PDF op BookSC]

10 Spinoza on the Association of Affects and the Workings of the Human Mind - Lisa Shapiro [ PDF op BookSC ]

11 The Terminology of the Affects in Ethics Parts III through V - Pina Totaro [PDF op BOOKSC ]

12 Moral Realism in Spinoza’s Ethics - Colin Marshall [PDF op BookSC ]

13 Spinoza and the Metaphysics of Perfection - Samuel Newlands [PDF op BookSC ]

14 The Free Man and the Free Market: Ethics, Politics, and Economics in Spinoza’s Ethics IV - Beth Lord [ PDF op BOOKSC]

15 Spinoza and the Power of Reason - Michael LeBuffe [ PDF op BookSC ]

Bibliography [ PDF op BookSC ]
Ethics Index

General Index
 


Het boek begint met vraagstukken rond de zgn. identiteitstheorie van Spinoza: hoofdstuk 1 van Don Garret, “The Indiscernibility of Identicals and the Transitivity of Identity in Spinoza’s Logic of the Attributes.” Maar hoezo zou de stelling dat de menselijke geest "een en hetzelfde ding is" als het menselijke lichaam, hetzelfde zou zijn als de volledige identiteit stellen? Vooral niet daar degenen die er een identiteitsthese in lezen, erop uitkomen Spinoza te laten zeggen dat lichamelijkheid en denken hetzelfde zijn. En dat doet Spinoza met zijn nadruk op causale en conceptuele gescheidenheid van attributen bepaald niet.

Andrea Sangiacomo besprak Spinoza's ‘Ethics'. A Critical Guide  in: Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol 56, Number 2, April 2018, p. 373 [ cf. PDF op BookSC ] en begon aldus: "This new Cambridge Critical Guide to Spinoza’s Ethics offers an extensive, thought-provoking, and up-to-date state of the scholarly conversation that surrounds one of Spinoza’s most studied masterpieces."
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Hierbij wijs ik tevens nog op een dissertatie van
Sam-Yel Park, A study of the mind-body theory in Spinoza. PhD thesis. Department of Philosophy, University of Glasgow, 1999 [PDF]
Abstract:
This thesis investigates Spinoza's mind-body theory starting with the discussion of the diverse interpretations of his mind-body theory such as hylomorphism., idealism, epiphenomenalism, and materialism. From the critical comments on inadequacies of these interpretations, it turns out that Spinoza's argument of the relationship between the mind and the body should be understood as holding that there is a non-causal relationship between the mind and the body and that they have equal weight.


Although the parallelistic interpretation is compatible with the above understandings, we cannot ascribe traditional parallelism to Spinoza. His parallelism is derived ftom his argument of identity between the mind and the body, which is basedo n his substancen ionism.a nd attribute dualism.W e should therefore understand Spinoza's mind-body theory as an identity theory which leads to a parallel relationship between the mind and the body. Since the double aspect theory argues both identity and parallelism between the mind and the body, the doctrine we should ascribe to Spinoza is the double aspect theory.

Furthermore, owing to the fact that Spinoza maintains substance monism and attribute dualism (assuming an objective view of the attributes of thought and extension, which are distinct), there is, in Spinoza's theory, an identity between mental and physical events while there is no identity between mental and physical properties: the mental and the physical events are one and the same event described under mental and physical properties, respectively. From the fact that Spinoza finds identity in individuals or events, but not in properties, it follows that his theory should also be understood as a kind of token identity theory.

There are difficulties in this interpretation. Spinoza tries to combine mind-body identity with the separation of attributes, but some have argued that the identity would threaten the doctrine that thought and extension are causally separate. Again, some have argued that if the attributes are distinct then a substance has more than one essence while if they are not really distinct, but only seen as distinct, then even God cannot know the true nature of reality. It is difficult to render Spinoza's claims both consistent and plausible, but I have tried to find arguments for some of Spinoza's claims in this area: my interpretation of Spinoza's mind-body theory entails both token identity and property (or conceptual) parallelism whilst ruling out type identity as well as substance parallelism. So, I have called Spinoza's mind-body theory a token double aspect theory.

Spinoza's discussion of the representative nature of ideas does not sit easily with his doctrine of parallelism, at least so far as finite beings are concerned, I have tried to make the doctrines consistent, but ultimately Spinoza seems to bring his representationalism and parallelism into line by appealing to the confused nature of human ideas.
Despite all the problems, Spinoza's thought on mind and body has seemed to many to promise real insight into the nature of mind and body, and I have tried to see how far modern versions of materialism (anomalous monism), person theory, and some developments in cognitive science can be said to follow strands in Spinoza's work.


Toegift

Cf. Dubbel-aspecttheorie op wiki

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